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ABSTRACT 
Mine warfare (MIW) has been a significant component of naval warfare since the U.S. 
Civil War and remains a threat to U.S. strategic efforts to maintain and control maritime 
lines of communication.  This report attempts to answer the question “Is a Naval mine 
point-defense strategy feasible?”  
The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) team applied a 
System’s Engineering approach to model and improve upon the Navy’s current Mine 
Counter Measure (MCM) capabilities by addressing the need for ship self-protection 
measures (SPM). The team initially identified, then made contact with, various MCM 
stakeholders within the U.S. Navy. This stakeholder interaction allowed for optimized 
MCM collaboration regarding current operational requirements and capability gaps. Four 
primary MCM missions were identified and statistically modeled in order to quantify and 
categorize critical functional characteristics that dictate success in an MCM mission. 
These modeled data were analyzed to determine the greatest contributing capability area. 
The team also compared four basic MCM system configurations in order to determine the 
most appropriate configuration for each primary mission scenario. This report showcases 
a systems engineering approach to requirements analysis and performance specifics 
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Projecting into the future of mine development and Mine Counter Measures 
(MCM) indications are that individual surface units will likely be vulnerable to advanced 
mine technologies. U.S. Naval Forces must be able to operate in the full maritime 
environment inclusive of the littoral regions in the face of the anti-ship mine threat. An 
organic point defense capability employed as a part of a layered defense capability with 
the purpose of detecting and defeating the advanced anti-ship mine will help enhance and 
ensure operational mission sustainability at both the unit and task force levels (Manke & 
Christian, 2007). 
This report addresses the feasibility of potential point-defense alternatives through 
the use of the system engineering process to research the following questions: 
• How do varying Navy missions impact mine point-defense strategy? 
• What is a cost effective anti-mine system?  
• What are the critical attributes (and critical attribute thresholds) for system 
success? 
• How can “layered” mine defense improve anti-mine operations’ risk vs. time 
tradeoff?   
• How will future mine technologies drive MCM technology development 
It is the recommendation of this report, given the cost of new system development 
and minimal impact to the risk vs. time tradeoff achieved through technologies modeled 
in this report, that the Navy continue to investigate the feasibility of new underwater 
technologies prior to substantially changing the Navy’s development strategy for mine 
countermeasures.  This report recommends the following areas of opportunity for further 
study: 
1. High resolution 3-D sonars (or bathymetry sonars) capable of defining small 
objects at ranges greater than 100 meters. 
 xx 
2. Advanced digital signal processing algorithms that can provide detection and 
near optical resolution of fully-buried mine-like objects. 
3. Low cost underwater kinetic systems that can engage submerged targets. 
4. Advanced non-linear echolocation techniques capable of detecting small 
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Naval mine warfare has been in existence since the revolutionary war. Though not 
considered extremely effective 230 years ago, the art and science were well developed by 
World War II (WWII) and used by all the major warring powers to defend regions 
through the tactical and strategic policies of anti-access (Benes and Sandel 2009) 
(Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Studies Board, National Research 
Council n.d.).  The first United States (U.S.)-Iraq war demonstrated the effectiveness of 
mine warfare with the near sinking of the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (Cornish 2003). 
Though crude even by the standards of the day, the mine caused nearly $100 million in 
damage to the frigate while having a relatively modest cost of approximately $1,500.  
A most effective way to limit an adversary’s ability to execute military operations 
is to limit their ability to maneuver within the battlespace and close with your forces. This 
is the philosophy behind Anti-Access, Area Denial (AA/AD) strategies (McCarthy 2012). 
The following quote is attributed to Dr. Milan Vego (Vego 2009):  
“The success of any major operation or campaign depends on the free movement 
of one’s forces in the theater. Without the ability to conduct large-scale movements on 
land, at sea, and in the air, operational warfare is essentially an empty concept.” 
A key component of AA/AD is mine warfare (Manke and Christian 2007).  The 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has had access to former Soviet 
Technology and has proceeded to develop mine warfare policy as well as advanced mine 
technology (Truver 2012). These technologies include smart systems that can detect and 
launch a mine from the sea floor, mines that provide for low detection through advanced 
materials and shaping, and mines that can also be launched and planted on the sea floor 
by carrier torpedoes. China is not alone in developing advanced mine technology. France, 
Spain, Russia and Finland all boast advanced technology mines and sell this technology 
on the open market placing this ship killing technology in the hands of anyone with 
sufficient capital and interest. 
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The U.S. Navy does possess dedicated maritime assets dedicated to the purpose of 
hunting and sweeping underwater mines in the form of the Avenger Class MCM ship. 
These ships can be extremely effective in the mine hunting role but because a relatively 
small number were built, their availability is limited. Additionally, because of the unique 
design that combines a small size with the use of light composites materials, the Avenger 
Class ship has limited sea keeping capabilities and generally must be transported for long 
distance deployments Figure 1. This was demonstrated in the recent deployment of 
Avenger Class MCM ships to the Gulf under threat of mining from the Iranians (Truver 
2012).  From an operational stand-point, the Avenger Class MCM ships do not regularly 
deploy with fleet units unless a need has been identified and the transport logistics can 
take days to weeks (Benes and Sandel 2009).    This means that fleet units may be put on 
station for days with an existing mine threat with limited means to counter the mine 
threat.   
 
 
Figure 1.   MCM ships being loaded and transported via dry-dock ship from Truver 2012 
New and innovative MCM technologies are needed to provide key 
transformational capabilities required by the tenets of Sea Power 21 Sea Shield and Sea 
Strike. MCM technologies are needed to provide the U.S. Navy with the ability to 
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dominate the battlespace, project power from the sea, and support forces ashore.  MCM 
technologies planned for introduction in the next decade include unmanned systems; 
remote systems, tethered systems; reconnaissance systems; minesweeping systems; and 
others (Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Studies Board, National 
Research Council n.d.).  Of particular note, systems such as the AN/BLQ-11 and the 
unmanned remote mine-hunting system (RMS) are intended for a search-only role and 
the RAMICS system provides a kinetic kill capability only for surface and near surface 
mines. There is currently no kinetic defense against mines at depths below the keel 
deployed on individual platforms for the purpose of protecting the platform or nearby 
assets 
 
Figure 2.   Remote Minehunting System (RMS) from the Committee for Mine Warfare 
Assessment, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council 2001 
The projected future of mine development and MCM indicates that individual 
surface units will likely be vulnerable to advanced mine technologies. U.S. Naval Forces 
must be able to operate in the full maritime environment inclusive of the littoral regions 
in the face of the anti-ship mine threat An organic point defense capability employed as a 
part of a layered defense capability with the purpose of detecting and defeating the 
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advanced anti-ship mine will help enhance and ensure operational mission sustainability 
at both the unit and task force levels (Manke and Christian 2007).  
B. SCOPE 
The research described in this report investigated a technology gap in the 
defensive capabilities of U.S. Naval ships to asymmetric underwater threats (e.g., mines).  
This research will take a particular interest in evaluating the feasibility of a point defense 
capability.  
The asymmetric underwater threat problem space spans the following problem 
areas: Mission planning, threat detection, threat assessment, and threat response.   
 
Figure 3.   Notional Data Flow 
 
Furthermore, the defense capabilities discussed in this project can be 
characterized as either passive or active.  But at a high level, the four aforementioned 
 5 
 
problem areas are applicable in all cases.  Those four problem areas are described in more 
detail in following sections.  Figure 3 depicts the notional flow of responding to a mine 
threat using the four problem areas previously mentioned.  
With these problem areas in mind, and the understanding of the mine environment 
and MCM, this report addresses the following five research questions: 
• How do varying Navy missions impact mine point-defense strategy? 
• What is a cost effective anti-mine system?  
• What are the critical attributes (and critical attribute thresholds) for system 
success? 
• How can “layered” mine defense improve anti-mine operations’ risk vs. time 
tradeoff?   
• How will future mine technologies drive MCM technology development? 
This research paper describes the efforts to evaluate the above questions, and the 
results of the analyses through which the team conducted an assessment of current point 
defense capabilities. The contents of this report are limited to the Decomposition and 
Definition components of the systems engineering Vee model depicted in Figure 5. The 
team performed concept explorations, determined high level concept of operations for 
operational situations (OPSITS), determined system requirements based on mission 
needs, stakeholder inputs and environmental factors, developed a high level design 
architecture, developed models to test the design architecture and further develop 
operational parameters.  
These operational parameters were then used to perform a limited sensitivity 
analysis. The team performed these tasks in order to answer the five research questions 
described above.  As a final task the SUTRS team performed a preliminary analysis of 
alternatives using a qualitative Analytic hierarchy Process (AHP) in order to provide a 
path forward for consideration of promising technologies for a point defense system. The 
final report does not include a detailed design component nor any of the integration and 
composition components of the Vee model as this was considered outside of the scope of 
the project.   
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C. STATEMENT OF OPERATIONAL NEED  
Based on research performed by Dahlgren Team members and conversations with 
the mine warfare community stakeholders, the following statement of need was 
developed: 
 
“The U.S. Navy needs a capability to safely perform operations in mined waters.” 
 
The SUTRS team is aware of development efforts in the area of remote mine 
clearance.  The probability that an undetected mine remains following clearance 
operations is substantial.  And given the consequences of an undetected mine, detonation, 
it is the position of the SUTRS team that there is a justifiable need for a layered defense 
capability for platforms.  With that in mind, the SUTRS team identified the following 
refined statement of need. 
 
The U.S. Navy needs a capability for Navy platforms to defend 
themselves from the threat of mines during operations in order to ensure 
operational mission sustainability at both the unit and task force levels. 
This capability needs to be adaptable to both legacy and future platforms 
and must have the system flexibility to integrate current and future 
technologies. 
1. Stakeholder Identification 
The team evaluated the many stakeholders and their interests.  This evaluation of 











Table 1.   Stakeholder Needs 
 
The identification of these stakeholders plays a key role in assessing 
requirements, functionality, and system architecture of the SUTRS system.  Later 
sections describe the role of these stakeholders throughout the project.  
2. System Resource 
Having identified the stakeholders and their needs, the SUTRS team analyzed 
how the stakeholders interfaced with the system and each other.  This illustration of need 
and resource flow is presented in Figure 4.  Figure 4 illustrates the flow of system and 
stakeholder needs that leads to a successful, sustainable system capable of providing safe 
operations in multiple environments.  
In addition to the stakeholders who are documented in Figure 4, the operationally 
relevant nodes are depicted as well.  A high level description of the information/resource 


























































































































Chief of Naval Operations x x x x
Commandant of United 
States Marine Corps x x x x
PEO IWS x x x
PEO Ships x x x
PEO LCS x x x
COCOMs x x x x x x
Support Facility x x
Trainer x x x x




























































































Figure 4.   System Resource Flow (OV-2) 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The following section describes the systems engineering methodology selected 
for the execution of this project.  
The system engineering process for the SUTRS project encompassed the 
following tasks: 
1.  Developing an Operational Concept 
2.  Identifying Stakeholder Needs and Requirements 
3.  Developing a high level Operational Node Architecture 
4.  Determining and characterizing the Projected Operational Environment 
5.  Determining Mission Capabilities based on Stakeholder Requirements 
6.  Develop a Preliminary Functional Architecture 




This system engineering process follows the “Vee” model in Figure 5.  The 
following sub-sections will describe how the Vee model was used to translate an initial 
capability need statement into a final product by decomposing capabilities into 
architecture and requirements, by tracing requirements into design, by implementing and 
testing the design until a final product has been established that addresses (and has been 
traced throughout to) the overarching need. 
1. Tailored Systems Engineering Plan 
Figure 5 below shows the modified Vee model to represent the systems 
engineering design and development process. It provides guidance for the planning, 
documentation, and reviews of the project. The Vee Model shows a relationship between 
the requirements that define the needs from the stakeholders and the verification process 
to demonstrate that the design and integration solution satisfies those requirements. 
A traditional systems engineering “V” shape formation depicts the definition and 
requirements decomposition on the left side and an integration and verification on the 
right side. The figure has been modified to show which of the System Engineering steps 
that this project undertook during this project. It shows the general concept, but does not 
include detailed product structure levels and iterations on the down stroke and its 
corresponding layered integration and verification process on the upstroke. This project 






Figure 5.   Vee Model of System Development from Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011  
2. Feasibility Study/ Concept Exploration 
When a deficiency is detected in an area and a system is needed to fill the gap, 
using the System Engineering process to fill that gap is ideal. At this point in time, there 
is no organic layered MCM defense on naval ships. In this step, initial research was 
conducted to determine the details and severity of the technological gaps in MCM and 
what areas are most in need of assistance. This feasibility study determined if the 
technology exists to fill this gap or if systems will need to be created.  
During this phase the stakeholders were contacted to get their inputs into the 
project. The stakeholder’s ideas about technologies and requirements was documented 
and noted. A stakeholder analysis was performed to determine which are the most 
important aspects and requirements of the system. This analysis provided information as 
to which areas of the system will need specific attention. Following completion of the 
stakeholder analysis, a needs analysis was conducted in order to determine required 
system functions, missions, and operational context.  The results of this analysis were 
documented in a Design Reference Mission (DRM). 
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3. Concept of Operations 
An initial Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was developed as a product of the 
systems engineering effort. A CONOPS is a document that describes the basic 
characteristics of the system. The CONOPS describes how this system (or system of 
systems) functions in its intended operational environment once fully developed and 
integrated.  The CONOPS was documented in the DRM. 
4. System Requirements 
High level system requirements are important to establish verification to specific 
design and development criteria early on in a project’s lifecycle. “The true system 
requirements need to be well defined and specified and the traceability of these 
requirements from the system level downward needs to be visible” (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011). The system requirements were determined from the stakeholder’s 
analysis as well as research into previous MCM systems. Equally important requirements 
were derived from the mission success criterions of the DRM and were implemented into 
the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) to ensure the traceability of the requirements 
from the top down. High level operational requirements which require specific attention 
are: Mission definition, performance and physical parameters, operational deployment or 
distribution, operational life cycle, utilization requirements, effectiveness factors, and 
environmental factors (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). High level Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) were also determined and 
listed in Sections III.B.2.a. and III.B.3.  These system requirements were maintained in 
CORE and are discussed in Section III.B.2. 
5. High Level Design 
Although a true high level design was not completed in this project, a high level 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was performed as well as a Qualitative Cost/Performance 
Analysis. The project performed research into possible Commercial Off the Shelf (COTs) 





platform point defense. A Qualitative Cost/Performance Analysis was performed to 
determine if any of the systems found would have a high level of benefit to the Navy 
without having a high cost. 
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II. MISSION CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first step in identifying the platform for operational success is to define the 
operational environment.  The team began this research project by developing a DRM.  
The following section is a collection of relevant excerpts from the DRM. Specifically, 
this section will describe the assumptions assumption used in follow-on research with 
regard to threat characteristics, mission threads, inter alia. 
B. MISSION 
The SUTRS system will need to defend against various threats within different 
operating environments.  The following section describes the overall mission the SUTRS 
is proposed to accomplish while considering the given threat characteristics and potential 
operational environments. 
1. Operational Concept 
The Sub-Surface Threat Response System is a System of Systems (SoS) that 
enables Navy ships to detect, classify, and neutralize mine-like threats in close proximity 
to a platforms hull.  The Sub-Surface Threat Response System Operational View -1 (OV-
1) Product (Figure 6) is derived from the Capability Need Statement, Mission Success 
Requirements and identified Operational Situations (OPSITs).  
As shown in Figure 6, OV-1 depiction provides a high level graphical and textual 
description overview for the future Navy platform. Included in this depiction is a typical 
Ship in the U.S. Navy inventory. The needline depiction (lightning bolt) shows required 
connectivity for the exchange of information between the ship and other generic units 





Figure 6.   OV-1 Theatre Combat Operation 
A vessel enabled with the SUTRS system onboard is tasked by the Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG) to enter potentially mined waters.  The platform detects multiple 
underwater objects, characterizes the threat to the platform, and responds to the threat if 
required.  The SUTRS system will communicate with the ESG to send coordinates of 
confirmed mines and to send/receive other intelligence. 
C. PROJECTED OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
The SUTRS capability must contribute to the three fundamental operational 
concepts of Sea Power 21, which encapsulates the U.S. Navy’s ability to project 
offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence around the world.  




• Sea Shield – reassure allies, strengthen deterrence, and protect joint forces 
through naval capabilities related to homeland defense, sea control, 
assured access, and defense projection overland. 
• Sea Strike – increase operational tempo, reach, and effectiveness through 
naval power projections leveraging Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 
precision, stealth, and endurance. 
• Sea Basing – project U.S. sovereignty globally and minimize vulnerable 
assets ashore by providing Joint Force Commanders with vital command 
and control, fire support, and logistics from the sea.  
Within these core operational concepts, three OPSITs were established as 
missions to reference for functional requirements. The anticipated uses of a mine-point 
defense capability include the following projected operational scenarios (Rhodes and 
Holder 1998): 
• Transiting Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC) 
• Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) 
• Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO) 
• Advanced Clandestine Reconnaissance 
These operational scenarios will be used to define anticipated environment 
characteristics and anticipated threats for the purpose of constructing a detailed OPSIT.  
In addition, the team identified a fourth potential scenario, Advanced Clandestine 
Reconnaissance, which was not identified by existing source material, but is relevant to 
the mine-defense problem space.  An overview of each projected scenario is provided in 
the following sections. 
1. Transitioning Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC) 
SLOCs are geographically constrained areas such as choke points, narrows, straits 
and estuaries around the world.  Typically, these sea lines have been and continue to be 
economically significant lanes of travel and commerce which are considered by all those 
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who use them to be critical resources to economic prosperity, which makes them easy 
and obvious targets for mining and other anti-access activities and attacks.  The primary 
Sea Shield functions which must be performed to ensure transit through these SLOCs are 
accelerated strike positioning, mine marking and avoidance, and high speed of advance 
mine countermeasures (Rhodes and Holder 1998).  
The notional chain of events which would dictate the functions of the SUTRS 
capability are as follows:  
The platform’s battlegroup receives intelligence that a critical SLOC has been 
mined.  The battlegroup plans a mission to clear the mines in order to grant access to the 
waterway.  The battlegroup executes the plan and identifies lanes of safe passage.  Once 
safe passage through the minefield has been identified, the battlegroup proceeds through 
the newly cleared channel. During transit, the platform encounters a mine that was not 
discovered during mine clearance, and the platform must respond to the mine threat. 
Follow-On Support and Sustained Operations 
2. Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) 
STOM is a transformational tactical application of enduring naval capabilities for 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), which exploits each of the enhanced 
capabilities described by expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW).  The primary 
attributes of this Sea Strike activity are tactical surprise, freedom of action and maneuver, 
and mine countermeasures “in stride.”  In addition to these attributes, typically there are 
no prescribed littoral landing lanes and mine countermeasures must be taken prior to 
main element maneuvers.  To achieve tactical surprise for conventional or 
unconventional (clandestine) forces, MCM activities, which precede primary maneuvers, 
must maintain a low operational profile, so operational security (OPSEC) dominates the 
risk equation (Rhodes and Holder 1998). 
The notional chain of events which would dictate the functions of the SUTRS 




The platform’s battlegroup receives intelligence that the water surrounding a 
critical strategic objective has been mined.  The battlegroup plans a mission to clear the 
mines in order to grant safe passage to the critical area.  The battlegroup executes the 
plan and identifies lanes of safe passage.  Once safe passage through the minefield has 
been identified, the battlegroup proceeds through the newly cleared minefield and 
conducts a landing. During the landing, the platform encounters a mine that was not 
discovered during mine clearance, and the platform must respond to the mine threat. 
3. Joint Forcibility Entry Operations (JFEO) 
Maritime enabled JFEOs may project power directly against the enemy in a coup 
de main or may attack across a beach and/or by vertical envelopment to establish 
lodgment to enable the introduction of follow-on forces.  Typically, this Sea Basing 
activity requires a reduced support footprint during preparation operations which include 
deliberate and close-in mine countermeasures, maritime environmental surveys, and 
amphibious landing preparation.  The balance of operational tempo versus operational 
security varies across the range of military operations supported by maritime JFEO.  
When JFEO is used as a “special operations forces springboard” OPSEC and low 
operational signature is a key vice assured clearance of all MCM threats (U.S. Armed 
Forces Joint Staff 2008). 
The notional chain of events which would dictate the functions of the SUTRS 
capability are as follows:  
The platform’s battlegroup receives orders to station in an operational area 
(OPAREA) in support of ground forces on land during military operations.  The 
battlegroup plans a mission to clear both the transit corridor and the OPAREA of mines.  
Following completion of the mine-clearance operation, the platform transits to the 
OPAREA either during that transit, or during station keeping in the OPAREA, the 
platform encounters a mine, and the platform must respond to the mine threat. 
4. Advance Clandestine Reconnaissance 
The platform’s battlegroup receives orders to collect intelligence for an OPAREA 
in preparation for a future mission.  The platform plans and executes a clandestine 
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operation to characterize the OPAREA; identify any threats in the area; and collect 
general intelligence.  Due to the clandestine nature of the reconnaissance mission, the use 
of dedicated MCM assets may not be feasible due to operational needs of time, tempo, 
and tactical surprise.  During reconnaissance, the platform encounters a mine and must 
respond to the mine threat. 
D. THREATS 
Unit Undersea warfare and Mine Counter Measure capability is required by the 
Sea Power 21 strategy to guarantee freedom of the sea.  The SUTRS provides an organic 
point defense capability to detect, track and engage close subsurface threats, including 
naval mines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and combat swimmers. 
Due to the cost-effectiveness of asymmetric underwater threats, such as mines, 
Navy forces will continue to be threatened in all maritime environments and all phases of 
a mission.  Appendix A describes the maritime environments in which the SUTRS is 
anticipated to be required to operate.  The descriptions include environmental 
characteristics and anticipated threats. 
1. Threat Characteristics & Projected Operational Environment 
Unit Undersea Warfare and Mine Counter Measure capability is required by the 
Sea Power 21 strategy to guarantee freedom of the sea.  The SUTRS is designed to 
provide an organic point defense capability to detect, track and prosecute close 
subsurface mine-like threats within a designated operational area of a platform.  
The SUTRS will be comprised of an integrated organic sensor and weapons suite 
and the maintenance and operation staff required performing the assigned mission under 
wartime conditions at sea, in harbors and in port. The staff will perform the following: 
1.  Maintain SUTRS’ materiel readiness condition to support fleet unit and task 
force operations. 
2.  Provide administrative support to meet operational requirements of deploying 
personnel. 
3.  Equip and train system operators. 
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4.  Provide resupply to deployed units.  
The most demanding operational environment anticipated for the Sub-Surface 
Threat Response System is a forward deployed wartime operation within the littoral 
battlespace, working in conjunction with designated joint forces.  These operations are 
frequently characterized by confined and congested spaces occupied by friends, 
adversaries and neutral parties. 
Due to the cost-effectiveness of sub-surface explosive devices, Navy forces will 
continue to be threatened in all maritime environments and all phases of a mission 
(Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Studies Board, National Research 
Council n.d.).   Therefore, the Sub-Surface Threat Response System will have to operate 
in multiple maritime environments and the system will have to be capable of responding 
to multiple types of current and future threats including a new category of threat known 
as a maritime Improvised Explosive Device (U. S. Navy 2007).  The effectiveness of 
these threats depends greatly on the depth of water; therefore, the projected operating 
environments must take into account depth of water (Figure 7).   
Table 2 describes the five classifications of operating environment along with the 
expected threats.  Furthermore, Table 2 also delineates an “Other” category for more 





Figure 7.   Naval mine depth regimes from PEO0602782N: Mine & Exp Warfare Applied 
Resolution 2011  
Table 2.   Threats by Operating Environment 
Threat Area Depth Potential Threat Type 
Craft Landing 
Zone 
~0 ft Anti-Personnel Mines and Obstacle 




10 - 40 ft Moored Mines, Bottom Mines 
Shallow Water 40 – 300 
ft 
Moored Mines, Bottom Mines 
Deep Water >300 ft Rising Mines 




III. DESIGN SPACE 
A. QUALITY FUNCTION DEPLOYMENT  
Once the needs from the stakeholders have been determined, consideration for 
alternative design approaches and concepts would require aiding the system design 
process through establishing the incorporation of technical characteristics to a design that 
meets the customer requirements. The QFD’s purpose “…is to establish the necessary 
requirements and to translate those requirements into technical solutions” (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011). An important part of this project was identifying the stakeholder’s wants 
and transferring those wants into usable applications for the project. A QFD base process 
was performed in order to prioritize capabilities of the system, trace functionality to 
identified requirements, and translate top-level requirements into proposed system 
configurations. In order to perform this analysis, the team performed a three step 
approach. First, the team performed a pair-wise survey of stakeholders to prioritize the 
top-level requirements.  Second, the team used the compiled results of those surveys in 
order to assign objective weights to each top-level requirement.  Third, the team 
decomposed the top-level requirements into Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) 
and system functions (QFD1 and QFD2).  The following subparagraphs describe these 
three analysis steps. The team realizes the following analysis is more so linked House of 
Quality (HOQ) matrices rather than QFDs, but will continue to refer to the charts as 
QFDs.  
1. Stakeholder Survey 
The team created and sent a pair-wise survey to all stakeholders (see Appendix B) 
for the purpose of identifying the relative value of proposed capabilities as compared to 
each other capability. The first three questions were used to associate individual 
responses with identified stakeholder groups. The questions identified that the minimum 
stakeholder age was 41 years old.  A majority of the stakeholders have served in the 
military as officers and are currently civilian employees or contractors for the federal 
government.  The stakeholders represent a variety of MCM professional experience from 
Military Users to Intelligence Analysts.  These demographic results indicate that the 
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survey is representative of the mine community.  The one potential limitation of the 
survey is that, due to the age of the stakeholder community, the survey may not reflect 
the most recent engineering advances.   
Ten mission capabilities were identified by the team as being important to the 
Navy’s MCM strategy (Section III.B.2.). Because the purpose of this project was to 
evaluate the feasibility of organic mine point-defense, the survey asked stakeholders to 
compare each mission capabilities to Underwater Threat Response. The stakeholders that 
participated in the survey are as follows: 
1. Program Executive Office (PEO) MINEWAR 
2. PEO Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), Program Manager Ship (PMS)-495 
3.  MIW Customer Advocate, Naval Surface Warfare Center – Panama City 
Division (NSWC-PCD), Code A04 
4.  Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  
 
 
Figure 8.   Pair-wise Results 
A pair-wise ranking was applied to the responses of the survey. All surveys were 
weighted equally. Figure 8 shows the results of the rating. The capabilities were 




1.  Underwater Threat Response 
2.  Underwater Object Identification  
3.  Underwater Object Detection 
4.  Survivability 
5.  Command and Control 
6.  Availability 
7.  Interoperability  
8.  Mission Planning 
9.  Environmental Compatibility  
10.  Environmental Characterization 
The pair-wise results give a weighted rank to all of the mission capabilities. These 
weighted ranks were then plugged into the QFD1 to help determine the relative weighting 
of the system requirements.  
The calculation for the weighted ranks required first to sort the stakeholder survey 
results into a criteria specification that helped establish a survey value legend as shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3.   Survey Value Legend for Mission Criteria Specification 
Survey Value Legend 
Much More Critical 9 
Strongly More Critical 7 
More Critical 5 
Slightly More Critical 3 
Equally Critical 1 
Slightly Less Critical 1/3 
Less Critical 1/5 
Strongly Less Critical 1/7 
Much Less Critical 1/9 
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This helped simplify the upkeep organization of each stakeholder input. Each 
translated stakeholder value for their respective mission capability was summed and then 
divided by the total number of stakeholders, which were five in our case.  The results of 
those values got implemented to the first row of the pair-wise comparison matrix as 
shown in Figure 8. The rest of the matrix was logical statements that compared each 
mission capability to the others. The tallied row summation of multiplying the weight 
inserted into a respective mission capability multiplied by the total column summation of 
each mission capability comparison resulted in each weighted rank to all ten mission 
capabilities. 
2. QFD Matrix 
A QFD matrix is a tool for translating capabilities to functions to components.    
The QFD matrix decomposes capabilities, functions, and components while also deriving 
prioritized weightings based on a non-linear scale.  Pair-wise comparisons were used to 
extract capability rankings since studies have shown that such paired comparisons are a 
natural decision making process that the human mind utilizes to determine the sense of 
preference, importance, or likelihood with respect to a certain property that the elements 
being compared have in common.  The fundamental scale of absolute numbers from 1-9 
which correspond to verbal comparisons are commonly used to represent comparison 
judgments derived from stimulus-response surveys and other comparative interactions.  
Mathematical conditions required for prioritization (ranking) stability dictate that the 
numerical scale be relegated to a small number of options, homogeneous, and limited to 
an upper value of 9.  By utilizing this fundamental scale, cumulative responses are less 
likely to result in perturbations or “clumping” caused by sequential associations or 
greater fidelity (larger numbers of comparative selections) that are restricted in the 1–9 
absolute numbers scale (Saaty 2001).  By utilizing this proves in three separate sub-
matrices, the QFD matrix is able to map capabilities to measures (QFD 1); measures to 





Figure 9.   QFD1 Mission Capabilities to Performance Metrics 
Figure 9 is an illustration of the QFD process.  The left side of the QFD identifies 
the stakeholder requirements along with the attribute priorities. These priorities are 
ranked in a quantitative manner based off the pair-wise rankings calculated and shown in 
Figure 8. The top of the matrix, highlighted in blue, identifies the key technical responses 
to the needs along with the target technical level that each characteristic should achieve to 
reach its threshold or objectives. These threshold and objectives were calculated based 
off of research and assumptions determine by the team.  
The results of the QFD1, illustrated in Figure 9, clearly indicate that the three 
most critical performance metrics were mean-time to respond, probability of detection, 
and detection range.  
The QFD2 mapped performance metrics, discussed in QFD1, to system functions. 






Figure 10.   QFD2 Performance Metrics to Functions 
The results of the QFD2 (Figure 10) indicate that the three most critical functions 
are: Identify Underwater Objects, Detect Underwater Objects, and Neutralize Underwater 
Objects.  
Due to the focus on concept exploration, the research paper in intended to support 
identification of candidate systems for composing a physical architecture.  For this 
reason, a QFD 3 was not performed.  
B. BUILDING SUTRS SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
Prior to defining an appropriate functional architecture for the SUTRS, the team 
had to: 
1. Define the operational environment within which the SUTRS must 
successfully deploy and operate.  
2.  Develop operational concepts  
3. Identify the stakeholder needs and define the key performance parameters  
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4. Develop a high level Operational Node architecture based on the identified 
needs 
1. Operational Nodes 
a. Node Context 
Figure 11 depicts the high level operational nodes relevant to the SUTRS 
Architecture. High Level Operational Nodes lists the high level nodes with their primary 
purpose. The threat areas described in Table 4 are defined by various oceanographic 
characteristics described in Appendix A.  Table 5 lists the level 2 external nodes relevant 
to the SUTRS functional architecture. 
 
 




Table 4.   High Level Operational Nodes 
Operational Node Primary Node Function 
Node Context (Level 0) This element is used to encompass all the top level operational 
nodes in the model via the "built from" relationship, so that all 
these components can be viewed in a context diagram. 
External Operational Nodes 
(Level 1) 
This element represents the collection of operational nodes that 
are external to the system under design. This element performs 
operational activities outside of the system boundary but is 
expected to interact with the system during its operation. 
SUTRS Node (Level 1) This element represents the top level operational node of the 
SUTR system under design.  It is a highly mobile system and 
can be deployed to platform that supports Mine Warfare 
operations. The System searches, detects, localizes, classifies, 
and identifies mine, mine-like threats. The System is deployed 
to the unit and taskforce level. The children of this element will 
constitute the hierarchy of logical elements that produce, 
consume, and process information within the system boundary. 
Table 5.   External Operational Nodes 
External Operational Node       
 ( Level 2) 
Primary Node Function 
Operator Node  This element represents the human operator that must provide 
one of several interfaces between the SUTRS node and other 
external operational nodes.  
Maintenance Node This element represents the collective nodes that provide parts and logistics for the maintenance, repair, and replacement of 
SUTRS components. 
Logistics Support Facility Node This element performs logistics activities outside of the system boundary and supports the maintenance functions as well as 
transport and delivery of required system components. 
MCM MP Ships This element performs activities outside of the system boundary necessary to deploy the SUTRS system during its 
operation. This element is physically represented by the host 
platform. 
Mine Intelligence Bureau This element performs intelligence activities and can be considered outside of the system boundary but is expected to 
interact with the system during its operation providing 
intelligence data such as environmental conditions, suspected 
locations and types of threats. 
Operator Training Facility This element performs SUTRS training activities and can be considered outside of the system boundary. This element 
provides the necessary training and education to STRS 





2. Mission Capabilities 
The Objective Sub-Surface Threat Response System capability will employ a 
wide range of networked Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and 
Intelligence (C4I) nodes. The mission accomplishment will be achieved through the 
following criteria: 
• Employment: External C4I Interfaces, data, sensors 
• Training: Personnel trained to conduct the Sub-Surface Threat Response 
System 
• Leadership: Clear commander’s intent and climate that fosters innovation 
• Maintenance: Neck-down in maintenance military occupational specialty 
(MOS), enhanced built in test (BIT), and component replacement 
• Equipment: Resident C4I Node, sensors and communications 
The success of the Sub-Surface Threat Response System depends on the system’s 
ability to accurately detect sub-surface threats and reliably coordinate an effective 
response.  This high-level statement of mission success criterion has been decomposed 
into eight mission categories with thirty-five mission sub-categories, and eight KPPs. The 
KPPs are described in Table 6. 
MC.1 Underwater Object Detection/Identification 
System will be able to detect and characterize all underwater objects within a 
specific minimum range of the platform. 
MC.1.1 Detection Sensitivity: The SUTRS shall detect sub-surface threats 
including mines and mine-like objects with a minimum aperture size as described in the 
requirements. 
MC.1. 2 Object Tracking: The SUTRS shall track sub-surface threats including 
mines and mine-like objects providing range and bearing. 
MC.1.3 Object Density: The SUTRS shall be able to track multiple objects. 
MC.2 Underwater Object Identification 
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The SUTRS shall provide for the automatic identification of sub-surface threats 
including mines and mine-like objects with a displayed level of confidence. 
MC.2.1 Identification Resolution: The SUTRS will be able to provide 
identification metrics of detected objects with confidence levels in real time. 
MC.2.2 Identification Update: The SUTRS identification function will provide 
identification confidence updates at minimum time intervals indicated in the 
requirements.  
MC.3 Command and Control (C4I) Interface 
System will provide comprehensive capabilities necessary for command, control, 
communications, computers & information between the SUTRS and other mission assets.  
MC.3.1 Information Distribution and Display: System will share status 
information, alerts, chat, checklists, reference material and collaborative links between 
systems as necessary to provide a common operating picture (COP) for commander's 
situational awareness (SA) 
MC.3.2 System Ready Status: System will provide visual and audible cues to the 
SUTRS operator as to the status and health of the SUTRS. This information will also be 
made available to the unit commander via capability MC.2 
MC.3.3 ROE: The SUTRS shall provide a capability to support Combat 
Command’s Rules of Engagement (ROEs) 
MC.3.4 Data Exchange: The SUTRS shall support communication, networking, 
and exchanging intelligence data in formats required for proper information interchange 
between components. 
MC.4 Underwater Threat Response 
System will eliminate or otherwise make harmless underwater objects determined 
to be a critical threats to the surface unit. 
MC.4.1 Probability of Hit: The SUTRS shall have the capability to engage a 
target at a minimum range of 100 meters as indicated in the System Requirements. The 
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SUTRS shall be able to engage a target at range with a circular area of probability not to 
exceed 2 square meters. 
MC.4.2 Depth of Magazine: The SUTRS shall have a magazine capacity to 
engage a minimum number of targets before exhaustion as indicated in the System 
Requirements. 
MC.4.3 Rate of Fire: The SUTRS shall have a minimum kinetic time to 
engagement threshold and minimum time to re-engagement threshold as indicated in the 
System Requirements 
MC.4.4 Operational Depth: The SUTRS shall be able to operate and engage 
targets at depth thresholds as indicated in the System Requirements 
MC.4.5 Mean Time to Respond: The SUTRS system shall be operational upon 
initiation within a time threshold as indicated in the System Requirements 
MC.4.6 Engagement Autonomy: Engagement system will provide for varying 
levels of autonomy to include manual operation and auto-special operation with manual 
override at the discretion of the unit commander. Engagement will be within 750 ms 
(Threshold) / 500 ms (Objective) of command signal 
MC.4.7 Engagement Status: The SUTRS shall provide a capability to report 
engagement status such as current load-outs, expended loads, and current functional 
status. 
MC.5 Survivability 
The SUTRS will have the capability of operating in an operationally contested 
environment to include natural and man-made environmental conditions.  
MC.5.1 Natural Environment: The SUTRS shall provide a capability to operate in 
the environments defined in the SUTRS DRM 
MC.5.2 Electromagnetic Environment: The SUTRS shall withstand 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and other Electronic Environmental Effects (E3) as defined 
in MIL-STD-461 and MIL-STD-464. 
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MC.5.3 Environmental Jamming: The SUTRS shall have the capability to 
overcome jamming of communication and sensor data. 
MC.6 Availability 
The SUTRS system shall demonstrate system availability as outlined in the DRM. 
The SUTRS shall meet or exceed an Operational Availability (AO) of 0.90 (Threshold) / 
0.95 (Objective) 
MC.6.1 Reliability: The SUTRS system shall demonstrate a system reliability for 
mission completion of 0.90 (Threshold) / 0.95 (Objective). 
MC.6.2 Maintainability: The SUTRS system shall demonstrate system 
maintainability as outlined in the DRM 
MC.6.2.1 MTTR: The SUTRS shall have a Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) of 3 
hours (Threshold) / 1 hour (Objective). 
MC.6.2.2 BIT: The SUTRS shall provide a capability to perform BITs. 
MC.6.3 Supportability 
The SUTRS system shall demonstrate system supportability as outlined in the 
DRM 
MC.6.3.1 Logistical Support: The SUTRS shall provide the logistical support to 
sustain the SUTRS assets already within the Area of Responsibility (AOR) for 20 
additional days. 
MC.6.3.2 Training and Simulation: System will be capable of providing simulated 
threat information and response for the purposes of training and sustainment of 
operational readiness. 
MC.7 Interoperability 
The system shall have the capability to integrate current and future sensor systems 
through a common physical and data interfaces based on open system architectures. 
MC.7.1 Open Systems Architecture: The SUTRS shall utilize open system 
architecture that allows for plug and fight capabilities 
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MC.8 Environmental Compatibility 
The system will be capable of operating in the maritime environment under 
differing conditions of temperature, pressure (depth from surface), salinity, and 
sedimentation. System will operate with minimal degradation in chemically degraded 
environments that include heavy fuel oils, light fuels such as kerosene or gasoline, 
alkaline and acids. 
MC.8.1 Environmental Factors: The SUTRS shall meet military requirement 
(MIL-STD-810G). MIL-STD-810G test series addresses a broad range of environmental 
conditions that include: low pressure for altitude testing; exposure to high and low 
temperatures plus temperature shock (both operating and in storage); rain (including wind 
blow and freezing rain); humidity, fungus, salt fog for rust testing; sand and dust 
exposure; explosive atmosphere; leakage; acceleration; shock and transport shock (i.e., 
triangle/sine/square wave shocks); gunfire vibration; and random vibration 
MC.8.2 Shock: The SUTRS shall operate without degradation following a Shock 
Test in accordance with MIL-S-901D. 
MC.8.3 Vibration: The SUTRS shall operate without degradation following a 
Vibration Test in accordance with MIL-STD-167B. The vibration frequency was swept 
from 4 to 22 Hz. MIL-STD-167B requires an exploratory vibration test (10-minute 
resonance survey sweep) a variable frequency test (5-minute dwell at each frequency) 
and a 2-hour endurance test at the resonant frequency. Vibration levels to be used for 
design and test of equipment shall be derived in accordance with MIL-STD-810, with 
appropriate modifications based on the SUTRS configuration. 
8.3.1 Control and display vibration shall conform to the requirements of MIL-
STD-1472, Paragraph 5.8.4.2 
MC.8.4 Corrosion: The SUTRS shall operate following the application of 
measures required to meet corrosion prevention and control as specified in MIL-STD-
1568 
MC.8.5 Sea State: The SUTRS shall demonstrate operational capabilities as listed 
in the KPPs in Seas State conditions through Sea State 5. 
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MC.8.6 Temperature: The SUTRS shall [a] operate in a temperature range of 33to 
120 degrees Fahrenheit (F). During non-operating conditions the system shall [b] 
withstand a temperature range of 0 degrees F to 140 degrees F. 
MC.8.7 Personnel Safety: The SUTRS shall include protection of personnel from 
electrostatic and electromagnetic shock hazards.  Where protection by design is not 
feasible, adequate safety precautions shall be included in operating and maintenance 
manuals.  Requirement 1 of MIL-STD-454 shall be used as a guide. 
a. Key Performance Parameters 
During the prior QFD analysis, the team documented a small set of 
assumptions and used those assumptions to generate Threshold and Objective values for 
multiple TPMs.  The assumptions used to evaluate those TPMs are as follows: 
• The threshold Probability of Success for the total system should be 90% 
survival. 
• The objective Probability of Success for the total system should be 95% 
survival. 
• The blast radius for a mine is 60m (Holmes 2006) 
• Ship’s speed in a minefield is 5 knots. (10 m / second) 
• In poor bottom conditions, the detection range will be poor (assumed a 
range of 200m). 
With this set of starting assumptions, it was determined that the platform 
would have a 14 second window of opportunity to defend itself from the mine.  The 
remaining TPMs were derived from these assumptions. 
Additionally, the analysis looked at Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Availability (RM&A) values.  Again, the analysis began with a few basic assumptions: 
• Due to criticality of the function, there is one system and one spare. 
• The system (with spare) should achieve a mission reliability of 90%. 
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Using these assumptions and the RM&A equations in the analysis also 
identified threshold and objective values for Operational Availability, Mean Time 
Between Failures, and Mean Time to Repair (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
Some of those TPMs, based on the results of the QFD analysis were identified as 
KPPs.  These KPPs are described in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) 
Key Performance Parameters Threshold  Goal 
KPP.1.  Detection Range 200 meters 1000 meters 
KPP.2.  Average False alarm rate 0.98 0.995 
KPP.3.  Engagement Range  100 meters 500 meters 
KPP.4.  Operational   Availability 0.80 0.95 
KPP.5.  Mean Time Between Failures 4000 hours 5000 hours 
KPP.6.  Maintainability MTTR = 3 hours MTTR = 1 
hour 
KPP.7.  Survivability Environmental Test 
Standards as cited in the 
DRM ( U.S. Navy 
OPNAV Instruction 
9070.10 n.d.) (U.S. Navy 
OPNAV 3401.3A n.d.) 
 
KPP.8.  Simultaneous Object Detection and 
Tracking 
5 objects 8 objects 
 
3. Mission Definition and Execution 
The following preliminary high level operational activities are identified below 
for this DRM.  The top level operational activity is the foundation of the program where 
as the first level operational activities are the children to OA.0.    The traceability of these 
functions for the future subsurface defense capability is displayed in Table 7. 
Top Level SUTRS Operational Activity: OA.0 Perform SUTRS Activities 
(Defend surface units) 
First Level Operational Activities:  
• OA.1 Detect/Track Threat 
• OA.2 Perform SUTRS C4I 
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• OA.3 Identify Threat  
• OA.4 Engage Threat 
• OA.5 Simulate Threat 
• OA.6 Determine System Health Status  
• OA.7 Display Common Operational Picture (COP) 
Table 7.   Operational Activity to Mission Capability Mapping 
High Level Mission Capability (BCEC) Related High Level Operational 
Activity 
MC.1 Underwater Object Detection/Tracking OA.1 Search/Detect/Track Threat 
MC.2 Object Identification OA.3 Identify Threat 
MC.3 C4I Interface OA.2Perform SUTRS C4I 
OA.7 Display COP 
MC.4 Underwater Threat Response OA.4 Engage threat 
MC.5 Survivability OA.0 Perform SUTRS Activities  
MC.6 Availability OA.0 Perform SUTRS Activities  
EXT.OA.2 Maintenance Activities 
OA.6 Determine System Health Status 
OA.5 Simulate Threat 
EXT.OA.2 Maintenance Activities 
OA.0 Perform SUTRS Activities 
MC.7 Interoperability OA.0 Perform SUTRS Activities  
OA.2 Perform SUTRS C4I 
OA.7 Display COP 
EXT.OA.1 Conduct External Operational 
Activities 
MC.8 Environmental Compatibility  OA.0 Perform SUTRS Activities 
 
The mission capabilities for the future subsurface marine defense are mapped to 
corresponding zero and first level operational activities.  Certain mission capabilities are 
mapped to the zero level since they support all operational activities equally. 
C. PRELIMINARY SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The following sections describe the SUTRS team’s development approach, 
development, and analysis of the SUTRS System architecture. 
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1. Model Based Systems Engineering Approach 
Due to the nature of the SUTRS problem space (i.e., submerged, hard to detect, 
explosive devices), pursuing a test driven engineering process proves to be cost 
prohibitive.  Therefore, the SUTRS team pursued a Model Based Systems Engineering 
(MBSE) approach, wherein the team first identified the necessary system capabilities and 
translated those capabilities into high-level functional architectures.  Having identified 
the functions, operational nodes, and data items necessary, the SUTRS team defined 
high-level operational scenarios that could be used to model the architecture.  The 
architecture modeling activities are described in Section III.D.1.  This section describes 
the process of defining the high-level functional architecture. 
The CORE® tool implements a MBSE approach to developing an architecture 
model and any related Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) views 
(Estefan, 2008; Vitech™ CORE®, 2007).  
2. Top Level Architecture 
The SUTRS team developed a functional model of the core capabilities of the 
envisioned SUTRS, and created an architecture using CORE®.  The created CORE® 
architectural model includes Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0) 
diagrams and Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagrams (EFFBDs) that can be used to 
simulate the architecture.   
The SUTRS Mission Thread consists of the core capabilities required to perform 
the SUTRS missions and are listed below: 
• Detect/Track Threat,  
• Perform C4I,  
• Identify Threat, 





• Determine System Health Status. 
• Simulate Threat 
• Display COP. 
The SUTRS team chose these top-level activities because, in the presence of a 
sub-surface threat, in order for safe force-level operations to continue in the threatened 
water space, the platform or battle group must identify the presence of a threat and 
respond to the threat.   
Threat identification consists of three core capabilities: Detection, Tracking, and 
Identification.  Detection and Tracking were combined because Tracking is an extension 
of Detection.  The primary difference is history.  Identification converts raw information 
into some assessment of level of danger.  Given the presence of a threat, the SUTRS will 
eliminate the sub-surface threat by engaging it by means of Tactics Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs), electronic counter-measures, or kinetic means. 
Additionally, because a SUTRS mission failure is a catastrophic failure, and 
because the operational environment is not easily accessible, status monitoring, training, 
and communication is essential. Therefore, the SUTRS team identified the additional 
supporting top-level functions of C4I, COP display, threat simulation, and System Status 
monitoring. The SUTRS functional hierarchy and IDEF0 are depicted in Figure 12 and 
Figure 13 respectively. 
 
 








The interfaces for the SUTRS system are composed of three primary types; 
functional, physical and environmental. Examples for each type are described in (Grady 
2010). Functional interfaces are those which provide a signal between components such 
as an electrical signal or digitally based signal via a transducer. Physical interfaces are 
those which must provide a form or fit of mating parts. An environmental interface 
occurs when the natural environment introduces or communicates environmental stress 
between elements. Environmental stress could be related to chemical or thermal qualities 
or ambient qualities such as light and noise. Environmental interfaces are particularly 
important with respect to Human Factors and Human System Integration.  
In this section we focus primarily on the functional interfaces leaving further 
discussion of physical and environmental interfaces until the discussion of analysis of 
alternatives (AoA). 
Figure 14 depicts the N2 diagram for the SUTRS System Functional Context. 
Entities such as external sensor systems, platforms or organizations perform the external 
functions represented by EXT.F.1 Node and pass the necessary data to the SUTRS for 
further processing. The SUTRS in turn provides data back to the external systems. This 
data is passed between the SUTRS and the external entities via “External Data Items” 
defined within the CORE® architecture model.  
Likewise, functional components within the SUTRS also pass data between 
components via “Internal Data Items” defined within the CORE® architecture. Figure 15 
depicts the N2 diagram for the SUTRS Functional Architecture. The resulting information 





Figure 14.   SUTRS Functional Context N2 
 
Figure 15.   SUTRS Functional Architecture N2 
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Table 8 lists and describes the modeled N2 architecture data items. 
Table 8.   N2 Architecture Data Items 
EXT.ITM.1 Environment 
Information 
This element represents the sum of information gathered by the system 
directly from the environment.  It is meant to include things like 
weather, intelligence, position information, etc. 
EXT.ITM.1.1 Ambient Water 
Environmental 
Information 
This is the aggregate information necessary to calibrate sensor 
equipment for purposes of detection, tracking, identification and 
engagement. 
EXT.ITM.1.1.1 Water Clarity 
Information 
This is information relative to the visibility conditions of the undersea 
environment with respect to optical, EM and acoustic sensors. 
EXT.ITM.1.1.2 Water Contamination 
Information 
This is information relative to the chemical contamination conditions 
of the undersea environment which can impact optical, EM and 
acoustic sensors. 
EXT.ITM.1.1.3 Water Salinity 
Information 
This is information relative to the salinity conditions of the undersea 
environment which can impact EM sensors and physical buoyancy 
considerations for object engagement. 
EXT.ITM.1.1.4 Water Temperature 
This is information relative to the temperature conditions of the 
undersea environment that can impact the optical, EM and acoustic 
sensors. 
EXT.ITM.1.2 Operational Environment 
This is information relative to population conditions of the undersea 
environment with respect to both type and numbers of objects. 
EXT.ITM.1.2.1 Sub-Surface Object 
Population Density 
This is information relative to holistic population conditions of the 
undersea environment with respect to numbers of objects. 
EXT.ITM.2 Mission Support 
This element represents the sum of information deliberately shared by 
friends and allies in support of the system's mission.  This element 
would be decomposed into the various specific types of information 
fitting this description. 
EXT.ITM.2.1 Friendly Systems 
Information 
This is aggregate information relative to friendly population 
conditions of the undersea environment with respect to types, purpose 
and numbers of objects. 
EXT.ITM.2.1.1 Numbers, Types 
This is information relative to friendly population conditions of the 
undersea environment with respect to types and numbers of objects. 
EXT.ITM.2.1.2 Operational Parameters 
Location information, communication protocols, purpose 
EXT.ITM.2.2 Threat Objects 
Encountered 
This is information is a characterized metric with respect to unfriendly 
system population conditions of the undersea environment with 
respect to types and numbers of objects. 
EXT.ITM.2.2.1 Type, Location, 
Detection Range, 
Engagement Range, 
Time to Engage 
This is information is a characterized metric with respect to unfriendly 
system population conditions of the undersea environment with 
respect to Type, Location, Detection Range, Engagement Range, Time 
to Engage threat objects 
EXT.ITM.3 Mission Resistance Data 
This element represents the sum of information deliberately shared or 
injected with unfriendly or malicious intent with the objective of 
hindering or resisting the system's mission.  This element would be 
decomposed into the various specific types of information fitting this 
description. 
EXT.ITM.3.1 Acoustic Disturbance 
Data 
This is information relative to the type and intensity of acoustic 
disturbances encounter within the SuTRS environment. 
EXT.ITM.4 Mission Outcome Data 
This element represents the sum of information returned to the 
system's environment as a consequence of the system performing its 
mission (successfully or unsuccessfully).  This element would be 
decomposed into the various specific types of information fitting this 
description. 
EXT.ITM.5 Regional Command Data 
This element represents the sum of information from the COCM in 
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support of the mission. 
EXT.ITM.6 Operator input 
This activity represents the operator's input to the system. 
EXT.ITM.7 Maintenance Response 
Response item from Depot Maintenance Facility in response to system 
status (this is a binary response based on status-fix or no fix) 
EXT.ITM.8 Platform Availability 
Data 
Schedule availability of the host platform for maintenance 
EXT.ITM.9 Rules of 
Engagement(ROE) 
Laws of Armed Conflict and situational policy 
ITM.0 SUTRS Data 
This element comprises all of the SuTRS collected data sets from 
detection to engagement to status 
ITM.1 Sensor Signal Data 
The energy that must be applied to actively detect an object. 
ITM.1.1 Compensation Data 
Environment Sensor Data for operational compensation factors. 
ITM.2 Contact Data 
This item represents the sensor data processed with the environment 
data. 
ITM.3 Threat Analysis data 
This item represents the processed contact data that has been identified 
as having hostile intent. 
ITM.4 Tracking Data 
Data that has been processed to provide tracking information for the 
engagement system. 
ITM.5 Engagement and Fire 
Control Data 
This data is an aggregate of tracking, characterization, and 
engagement priority data as well as data indicating autonomy status. 
ITM.6 Simulation Data 
This is data generated through the use of predetermined sets collected 
for the purposes of training crew and exercising C4I components of 
the SuTRS. 
ITM.7 System Status 
This is health status system data generated during SuTRS operations 
that indicates health and availability status of the SuTRS. 
ITM.7.1 Ready Status 
Load status for number and type of projectile. 
ITM.7.2 Lock Target Status 
Status of the articulation Node for physically aligning the targeting 
system with the threat based on tracking data. 
ITM.8 System Fault 
This is "just in time" indicator data to indicate a failure in the SuTRS 
system. 
 
ITM.9 Engagement Status 
Message 
Terminal message from engagement system indicating status of 
engagement (active, terminated, ready) 
ITM.10 System Bootstrap 
Element represents data cycling and System Boot checks to determine 
operational status upon system start-up.  
ITM.11 System Configuration 
Data (ROM) 
Baseline System Configuration Data ROM used to determine system 
status on boot-up 
ITM.12 COP Actionable 
Information 
This element represents data and information that is actionable either 
by the operator, such as warnings and status, but also queries from and 
to the SuTRS operator to external systems. 
4. Operational Scenarios 
The SUTRS team identified four high-level scenarios (described previously in 
Section II.C) requiring the need for mine point defense. The high level scenarios were 
grouped under two generalized SUTRS OPSITS: 
• Coordinated search and engagement OPSIT 
o Ship to Objective Maneuver 
 44 
 
o Transiting SLOC 
o Joint Forcible Entry Operations 
o Advance Clandestine Reconnaissance 
• Simulation Training Engagement OPSIT.   
a. Coordinated Search and Engage OPSIT 
Figures 16 illustrates the search and engage OPSIT. The purpose of this 
OPSIT is to provide a high-level description of the SUTRS capability to interrogate and 
engage contacts communicated to the SUTRS platform from units external to ship. 
The coordinated aspect of this scenario focuses on non-peacetime 
operations.  As such, this operational scenario is most relevant to OPSITs as identified in 
the SUTRS DRM.   
 
 
Figure 16.   Coordinated Search and Engage Scenario 
Description 
• A Threat is present in the operational environment. 
• A platform external to the SUTRS resident platform sends a mission to 
eliminate the threat to the SUTRS C4I Node. 
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• The SUTRS C4I node sends sensor control data to direct the Detection Node 
to search the OP-AREA, alert the COP to the operator, and contact to the 
Identification Node. 
• The SUTRS Detection Node sends contact data to the SUTRS C4I Node. The 
Operator receives the mission and inputs commands into the SUTRS C4I 
Node. The SUTRS Identification Node evaluates the contact data and sends 
the threat data to the C4I Node. 
• Through command and decision, the C4I Node sends Fire Control Data to the 
Engage Node. 
• The SUTRS Engage Node sends threat engagement back via the Link Node 
for feedback purposes, and engages the threat. 
•  The SUTRS engagement is either successful or non-successful, which 
impacts the threat characteristics. 
• The SUTRS Detect Node collects updates to existing contacts and sends to the 
Identification Node. 
• The SUTRS Identification Node assesses the new threat level based on the 
contact updates and sends the revised Threat Data to the C4I Node. 
• The C4I Node processes the updated Threat Data and displays Engagement 
Status Data to the operator. 
• The operator processes the Engagement Status Data, determines the success of 
the mission, and inputs a Battle Damage Assessment. 
• The SUTRS C4I Node processes the Battle Damage Assessment and sends 




b. Simulation Training Scenario 
Figure 17 illustrates the Simulation Scenario. The purpose of this 
operational scenario is to provide a high-level description of the Sub-Surface Threat 
Response System’s capability to improve system reliability by providing a simulated 
threat during peacetime training operations. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Simulation Scenario (placeholder) 
Description: 
• Prior to own ship operations, the SUTRS operator loads mission threat 
templates and rules of engagement—into the C4I Node. 
• During training operations, a simulated threat is present in the operational 
environment and actual environmental data can be introduced into the 
simulation. 
• The SUTRS simulation Node processes the environmental data and sends 
simulation data to the Detection Node. 
• The SUTRS Detection Node processes the actual or simulated 
Environment Data and sends Contact Data to the Identify Node. 
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• The SUTRS C4I Node sends simulation data to the COP Node for 
engagement analysis and operator inputs respectively. 
• Through command and decision, the C4I Node sends Fire Control Data to 
the Simulation Node for simulated engagement. 
• The SUTRS Simulation Node engages the threat. 
•  The SUTRS engagement is either successful or non-successful, which 
impacts the threat characteristics. 
• The Simulation Node processes the simulation data, and sends system 
status to the Diagnostics Node. 
5. Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram Models 
Using the Operational Scenarios as a roadmap for interface specifications, 
functional precedence, and data flow, the SUTRS architecture team constructed EFFBDs 
that could be used to model the overall architecture.  These EFFBDs are discussed in the 
following section. 
Figure 18 shows the high-level system context EFFBD for the SUTRS with 
appropriate control constraints applied to produce the high-level operational activities. 
Viewing the flow of functions from left to right, it is apparent that the physical 
architecture must conduct operational activities asynchronously between external 






Figure 18.   SUTRS Functional Context EFFBD Diagram 
The functional activity model for the function “perform SUTRS activities” is 
shown in Figure 18. The activities from the function “perform SUTRS activities” are 
• Perform SUTRS C4I,  
• Detect/Track Threat, 
• Identify Threat, 
• Display COP, 
• Engage Threat,  
• Simulate Threat,  




Figure 19.   Perform SUTRS Activities Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram (EFFBD) 
with Iteration Loop 
The SUTRS activity flow using the EFFBD in CORE® (as shown in Figure 19) 
represents the functional activity needed to complete a system task type. The SUTRS 
functional Activities are 
• Detect/Track Threat [F.1] - Represents the activity of searching, detecting, 
and tracking a contact providing this information for further analysis by 
the system. 
• Perform SUTRS C4I [F.2] - Represents the system capability to display 
and distribute operational environment data, contact data, threat data, and 
system status information to the operator and any external systems through 
the external C4I node  
• Identify Threat [F.3] - Represents the system's capability to categorize a 
detected contact's threat level. 
• Engage Threat [F.4] - Represents the system capability to respond to a 
sub-surface threat and neutralize the threat. 
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• Engage Threat Kinetically [F.4.1] - Operator performs engagement 
functions through a submerged kinetic kill close in weapon system for 
torpedo and mine defense.  
• Employ Acoustic Decoy Activities [F.4.2] - System deploys acoustic 
decoy system for counter-detection and spoofing of mines and torpedoes.  
• Perform Simulation and Training [F.5] - Represents one of the child 
activities Simulate of the top level function Conduct SUTRS Functions. 
This element could constitute a lower level hierarchy of activities 
performed by the various components making up the Search Function.  
• Display COP [F.7] - Provides fused data information, SA and 
collaboration tools to the SUTRS operators.  
• Perform Health Status Tests [F.6] - System provides Health Status via 
BITs 
In Case II, the alternate branch contains 
• Perform SUTRS C4I [F.2],  
• Simulate Threat [F.5] 
• Display COP [F.7] performed in parallel, signified by the AND logic. 
• Perform Health Status Tests [F.6] - System provides Health Status via 
BITs 
In both Scenarios I and II, when the remaining function “Determine System 
Health Status” [F.6] is complete, the flow continues to the end of the process and outputs 
are produced.  
The SUTRS uses items as input and output data stores and/or triggers in support 
of the SUTRS mission. The functions of SUTRS perform in execution whether a data 
store is or is not present. But the triggers are modeled as inputs at the higher levels of the 
architecture and converted to control inputs only at the lowest implementation level in 






Data Store Items 
• Environment Data [EXT.ITM.1] - Represents the sum of information 
gathered by the system directly from the environment.  It is meant to 
include things like weather, intelligence, position information, etc. 
• Mission Support Data [EXT.ITM.2] - Represents the sum of information 
deliberately shared by allies in support of the system's mission. 
• Mission Resistance Data [EXT.ITM.3] - Represents the sum of 
information deliberately shared or injected with unfriendly or malicious 
intent with the objective of hindering or resisting the system's mission. 
• Mission Outcome Data [EXT.ITM.4] - Represents the sum of information 
returned to the system's environment as a consequence of the system 
performing its mission (successfully or unsuccessfully). 
• Regional Command Data [EXT.ITM.5] - Represents the sum of 
information from the COCOM in support of the mission. 
• SUTRS Data [ITM.0] - Represents SUTRS data. 
• Sensor Signal Data [ITM.1] -The characterized energy signal that must be 
transmitted to actively detect an object. 
• Contact Data [ITM.2] - Represents the processed environmental contact 
data. 
• Threat Analysis Data [ITM.3] - Represents the processed contact data that 
has been identified as having hostile intent. 
• Tracking Data [ITM.4] - Data that has been processed to provide tracking 
information for the engagement system. 
• Engagement and Fire Control Data [ITM.5] - Data that has been processed 
and is an aggregate of tracking, characterization, and engagement priority 
data as well as data indicating autonomy status. 
• Simulation Data [ITM.6] - Represents simulation data. 
• System Status [ITM.7] - Represents system status for SUTRS. 
• System Fault [ITM.8] - Represents system fault status for SUTRS. 
• Engagement Status Message [ITM.9] - Terminal message from 




• System Configuration Data [ITM.11] - Baseline System Configuration 
Data ROM used to determine system status on boot-up. 
• COP Actionable Information [ITM.12] - Represents data and information 
that is actionable either by the operator, such as warnings and status, but 
also queries from and to the SUTRS operator to external systems. 
Trigger Items 
• Operator Input [EXT.ITM.6] -Represents the operator's input to the 
system. This trigger is input to Detect/Track Threat, Identify Threat, 
Engage Threat, Simulate Threat, and Display COP. 
• Platform Availability Data [EXT.ITM.8] - Schedule availability of the 
host platform for maintenance. This trigger is input to Perform 
Maintenance Activities. 
• Rules of Engagement [EXT.ITM.9] - Laws of Armed Conflict. This 
trigger is input to Engage Threat. 
• Engagement and Fire Control Data [ITM.5] - Represents engagement and 
fire control data. This trigger is input to Simulate Threat. 
• System Bootstrap [ITM.10] - Represents data cycling and System Boot 
checks to determine operational status upon system start-up. This trigger is 
input to Determine System Health Status. 
D. ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
1. Discussion of CORESim® Results 
a. OPSIT I 
Figure 20 is a graphical representation of the CORESim® output of 
SUTRS Functions representing activities that would occur during Scenario I. In this 
simulation run, the SUTRS performs fifteen activities. The simulation executes without 
any anomalies. 
The functions are executed sequentially and in parallel. The higher level 
SUTRS functions are executed sequentially and then repeated using a loop construct 
(iterative loop). This will be repeatedly executed in sequence until a preset domain value 




Figure 20.   Case I CORESim® Results 
b. OPSIT II 
Figure 21 is a graphical representation of the CORESim® output of 
SUTRS Functions representing activities that would occur during the Training Simulation 
OPSIT II. In this simulation run, the SUTRS performs five activities. The simulation 
executes without any anomalies. 
The functions “Display SUTRS Functions”, “Distribute SUTRS data 
shipwide via the Combat Integrated Display system”, “Perform SUTRS C4I” and 
“Perform Simulation and Training Activities” are executed sequentially. The “Determine 




Figure 21.   Case II CORESim® Results 
In both OPSITs I and II, the functional activity names are listed in the 
column on the left. The dark green blocks correspond with activities that have no trigger. 
The light green indicates that the activity was triggered by outputs from another activity.   
The CORE® architecture was modeled by placing both Scenario I & II 
activities in parallel with an “or” gate.  When the CORESim® (simulation) is run on this 
model, the simulator generates a random number and selects the appropriate branch 
(either Scenario I or II). If we reset and run again, our results will vary since we are using 
a random number generator to select the appropriate branch. 
The resulting time measurements reflect a SUTRS MOE—“Mean Time 
To Respond”.  Therefore, by simulating the architecture, we can identify any activities 
that are increasing the engagement timeline.  The results of our simulation indicate that, 
in both Scenarios I and II, the cycle time to engage a sub-surface threat has a rough order 
of magnitude of ~30 seconds from detect to engage. The purpose of the timing window is 
to demonstrate an order of operations for the functional architecture. The timing 
parameters used preferred minimum time to respond for each functional step and each 
parameter used a statistical distribution to show the expected functional variability. 
Because no comparable technology currently exists, the actual viability of these 
parameters is an unknown and physically reasonable estimates for function delay 
intervals such as slew rate and time to fire were used.  Depending on the model results, 
these values can be scaled based on the parameters of the final system configuration. 
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E. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
The overall goal of the SUTRS Modeling and Simulation effort is to characterize 
the relevant attributes that impact the overall effectiveness of a generic MCM system.  
This is accomplished through the use of both a high level “Back of the Envelope” (BOE) 
calculation and a detailed simulation. The selection of meaningful input to the simulation 
is a critical step in this process.  The QFD process provided a vehicle to determine what 
parameters are relevant to the project stakeholders.  When combined with modeling and 
simulation a trade space can be established and used for architecture development. 
1. Modeling Design and Assumptions 
a. Back of the Envelope 
In order to begin the modeling and simulation process, a BOE model was 
generated.  The purpose of this model was to: 
1. Create a graphical representation of the problem space,  
2. To generate a symbolic mathematical characterization of the problem 
that could be used as a basis for future detailed models, 
3.  And, in general, to identify key assumptions early in the process. 
For the purposes of threat response systems, the BOE model started with 
the following axioms: 
 
1.  A “response” must first be triggered by the presence of a “threat”.    
2.  For any pair of surface platform and threat, there is a Closest Point of 
Approach (CPA)—a point at which the platform is as near to the threat as 
it can be without changing course. 
3.  A vessel with a linear distance to a mine that is less than the attenuation 
radius will cause the mine to detonate. 
 




1.  All threats are mines. 
2.  A “mine” threat’s depth is constant. 
3.  A surface vessel can only move in two dimensions. 
4.  The surface platform’s course and speed do not change (i.e., there is no 
acceleration). 
5.  The mine’s attenuation radius (i.e., the distance from mine to target at 
which the mine detonates) is equal to the mine’s blast radius. 
With this set of assumptions, Figure 22 describes the orientation of a 
surface vessel and mine in 3-dimensional space as the surface platform approaches the 
mine along any approach vector.  
 
 
Figure 22.   BOE Visualization 
Note: this visualization’s orientation attempts to simultaneously express 




It can be shown that the distance from the ship to the CPA along the ship’s 
vector can be expressed as follows: 
 𝑥(𝑡) =  𝑥0 − 𝑣 ∗ 𝑡 (1) 
Where, 
 
“x0” is the distance from ship to CPA at time 0, 
“v” is the ship’s velocity, and 
“t” is time. 
 
Because x(t) is non-constant, the angle θ must also be a function of time.  
Equation 2 expresses θ as a function of time. 
 




“CPA” is a constant representing the closest point of approach. 
Next, the ship’s vector is converted into the 2-dimensional (i.e., on the 
surface) hypotenuse, which represents the distance to CPA as a function of time. 
 𝑟(𝑡) =  𝐶𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝜃(𝑡) (3) 
 
Substituting Equation 2 into Equation 3 results in the following: 
 




Now, having expressed the distance to CPA as a function of time, 
performing a similar operation in the z-plane which uses Depth as the constant resolves 
the radial distance from surface vessel to mine threat in 3-dimensions. 
 𝜑(𝑡) =  𝑡𝑎𝑛−1 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝑟(𝑡)  (5) 
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Substituting Equation 4 into Equation 5 results in the following: 
 







Equation 6 is useful for fully characterizing the BOE model in 3-
dimensions; however, it is unnecessary for completing the computation of the distance to 
the mine because r(t) and Depth fully characterize the total distance using the 
Pythagorean theorem. 
 
 𝑓(𝑡) =  �𝑟(𝑡)2 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ2 (7) 
Where 
“f(t)” is the distance in 3-dimensions from the platform to the mine as a 
function of time. 
Substituting Equation 6 into Equation 7 results in the following: 
 
 
 𝑓(𝑡) =  ��𝐶𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝑠𝑖 𝑛 �𝑡𝑎𝑛−1 𝐶𝑃𝐴
𝑥0−𝑣∗𝑡
��
2 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ2 (8) 
 
Thus, using Equation 8, if CPA, mine depth, initial velocity, and initial 
distance to CPA is known, the point-to-point distance from mine-to-platform can be 
calculated as a function of time.  These calculations have been substituted into Figure 23 
to produce the following graphical and mathematical BOE model. 







Figure 23.   Graphical and Mathematical BOE Model 
The importance of this graphical and mathematical model is that, given 
our axiom that a vessel within the radius of attenuation will cause a mine to detonate; we 
can use Figure 23 to determine whether a ship has “encountered” a mine.   Thus, a model 
that compares linear distance to radius of attenuation (which has been assumed to be 
equal to the blast radius) was created in ExtendSim® and validated using Excel. 
These models were the basis for the research described in this report.  The 
results of those models are described in Section II.E.6. 
b. Excel Simulation 
Having established the BOE calculations that would be the foundation of 
more detailing simulation, SUTRS engineering team created a basic model of ship 
motion and mine triggering using Microsoft Excel®. The equations described in the 
previous sections were calculated, in a tabular format, using a dt of 1 second.  These 
values were extended down through the spreadsheet as though the ship would approach 




Table 9.   Simulation spreadsheet headings 
Time (s) x-distance (m) theta (deg) cpa projection Linear Distance(m) 
0 400.000 4.358 2.316 401.166 
1 387.653 4.496 2.389 388.857 
2 375.307 4.643 2.467 376.550 
3 362.960 4.800 2.551 364.246 
4 350.613 4.968 2.640 351.946 
5 338.267 5.149 2.735 339.648 
6 325.920 5.343 2.838 327.354 
7 313.573 5.552 2.949 315.065 
8 301.227 5.778 3.068 302.780 
9 288.880 6.023 3.198 290.501 
Continued 
 
The formulas used in the distance calculations were linked to a table of constants (Table 
10), enabling rapid changes of the values being modeled.  Unit conversions were also 
applied.  









Excel®’s conditional formatting function was employed to highlight the linear distances 
at which a mine was detected and/or triggered in yellow and red, respectively.  This 
Constants 
Speed 24 knots 12.34667 m/s 
Initial Range 400 m 400 m 
Mine Depth 100 ft 30.48 m 
Blast Radius 300 ft 91.44 m 
Detection Range 200 m 200 m 
CPA 100 ft 30.48 m 
Conversions 
knots to m/s 0.514444 
   ft to m 0.3048 
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visual dashboard display gave the SUTRS engineering team a quick representation of the 
order of magnitude of the effect of changes in model inputs.  The output was used during 
detailed model design. 
c. ExtendSim® Simulation 
The concept developed in the initial model was refined and a more 
detailed simulation was constructed using ExtendSim® modeling software package.  This 
tool allows a graphical block development of detailed simulations with detailed database 
input. ExtendSim®’s versatility was leveraged to create a realistic timeline for detection, 
and engagement/neutralization of a mine threat, in stride. 
The basic functionality of the model was derived from a blend of the 
operational activities and system functions from the operational and system architecture.   
The model simulates the ship moving at a rate of 5–20 kts approaching a 
mine.  Modeling and Simulation efforts could have been conducted using CORE® and the 
architectures within that database; however, this is somewhat of a constraint of the model 
since some of the concepts of implementations are so diverse that they do not include 
some of the same system functionality.  This however is not a limitation of the systems 
engineering process as these concepts are being evaluated in part by the model, but also 
in part by other methods that will account for the diversity. 
2. Design of Experiments and Response Surface Models 
a. Taguchi Methodology 
The model has 9 inputs and each of these inputs can vary between a range 
of values. This makes choosing values to apply to each variable for a run of the model 
complex. Design of Experiment (DOE) concepts aid in creating input combinations that 
will show all of the interactions between variables after statistical analysis.  One possible 
way to perform a design of experiment with a number of variables that each have 
multiple possibilities is to have as many runs as it takes to include all possible 
combinations; this is called a full factorial design ( Information Technology Laboratory 
Homepage. N.p., n.d. Web n.d.). However, with 9 variables that each have 3 values, this 
would require 729 runs to test all possible combinations. The Taguchi Method is a way to 
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create a set of inputs that allows the experimenter to analyze all of the interactions 
between variables without requiring the large number of runs prescribed in a full factorial 
design (Fraley, et al. n.d.). Orthogonal arrays are used in the Taguchi Method to achieve 
the correct variability in the input combinations. A “Design of Experiments” (DOE) was 
used in the analysis of this project in the following subsections. 
Table 11.    Taguchi Model Variables 
Attribute Low Med High 
Prob. Detection 0.2 0.5 0.8 
Prob. 
Identification 0.2 0.5 0.8 
Prob. Kill 0.2 0.5 0.8 
Detection Range 100 500 2000 
Engagement 
Range 50 200 500 
Engagement 
Time 0.2 2 20 
False Alarm Rate 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Sensor Cycle 
Time 2 1 0.25 












Table 12.   Taguchi Model from The University of York, N.p. 2004  
 
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
a. Data Extraction 
Many different attributes were collected from the model; these include the 
range at which the object was detected, the range at which it was identified, the range at 
which it was engaged, and if it was not engaged successfully the range at which the mine 
detonated.  Since the main objective of the SUTRS modeling and simulation program is 
to determine attributes that are relevant to the success of a mission, the key output that 
will be analyzed is whether or not the mine was engaged successfully.  If it was not 
engaged successfully, then the mine would cause damage to the ship.  Since we know 
that these mines are an asymmetric threat based on cost of a mine vs. the damage it is 
capable of doing, the output that counts the number of times damage is done to the ship is 
deemed to be most critical. 
Experiment Number Prob. DeteProb. IdenProb. Kill Detection Engageme  Engageme  False Alarm Sensor Cyc  Approach Speed
1 0.2 0.2 0.2 100 50 0.2 0.1 2 5
2 0.2 0.2 0.2 100 200 2 0.2 1 10
3 0.2 0.2 0.2 100 500 20 0.3 0.25 20
4 0.2 0.5 0.5 500 50 0.2 0.1 1 10
5 0.2 0.5 0.5 500 200 2 0.2 0.25 20
6 0.2 0.5 0.5 500 500 20 0.3 2 5
7 0.2 0.8 0.8 2000 50 0.2 0.1 0.25 20
8 0.2 0.8 0.8 2000 200 2 0.2 2 5
9 0.2 0.8 0.8 2000 500 20 0.3 1 10
10 0.5 0.2 0.5 2000 50 2 0.3 2 10
11 0.5 0.2 0.5 2000 200 20 0.1 1 20
12 0.5 0.2 0.5 2000 500 0.2 0.2 0.25 5
13 0.5 0.5 0.8 100 50 2 0.3 1 20
14 0.5 0.5 0.8 100 200 20 0.1 0.25 5
15 0.5 0.5 0.8 100 500 0.2 0.2 2 10
16 0.5 0.8 0.2 500 50 2 0.3 0.25 5
17 0.5 0.8 0.2 500 200 20 0.1 2 10
18 0.5 0.8 0.2 500 500 0.2 0.2 1 20
19 0.8 0.2 0.8 500 50 20 0.2 2 20
20 0.8 0.2 0.8 500 200 0.2 0.3 1 5
21 0.8 0.2 0.8 500 500 2 0.1 0.25 10
22 0.8 0.5 0.2 2000 50 20 0.2 1 5
23 0.8 0.5 0.2 2000 200 0.2 0.3 0.25 10
24 0.8 0.5 0.2 2000 500 2 0.1 2 20
25 0.8 0.8 0.5 100 50 20 0.2 0.25 10
26 0.8 0.8 0.5 100 200 0.2 0.3 2 20
27 0.8 0.8 0.5 100 500 2 0.1 1 5
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b. Main Effects 
One of the most common and most effective ways of analyzing a Taguchi 
DOE is to produce Main Effects Plots (MEPs).  This allows for graphical analysis which 
will identify the critical attributes relevant to the factor of whether or not the ship was 
damaged.  Figure 24 shows the MEPs for the SUTRS enabled ship being damaged or not 
as it relates to all of the variables that were modeled.  This does not include the 
parameters that were held constant throughout the modeling. 
 
 
Figure 24.    Main Effects Plot for Means 
These attributes can now be described as: 
• Probability of Detection 
Has some impact on the overall success of the mission, but the extent of which is 
unknown at this point since this only shows one attribute at a time.  This does 
show that a system can be effective with a modest probability of detection as long 
as the sensor provides the capability for multiple opportunities for detection.  
Further discussion of the interactions of different attributes will be presented in 
the next section.  This limitation in the modeling is not considered to be a 
negative aspect of the model; combinations of attributes will be explored in the 
next section so as to show the relationship between probability of detection and 
other variables. 
























Prob. Identification Prob. Kill
Detection Range Engagement Range Engagement Time
False A larm Rate Sensor C y cle Time A pproach Speed




Has some impact on the overall success of the mission, but the extent of which is 
unknown due to conditions that cannot be modeled easily with the tools and 
methods used.  This is similar to the situation that involves probability of 
detection.  Due to the looping in the model, which allows for multiple 
opportunities to identify the object, there is a high likelihood that the object will 
be identified at some point.  This minimizes the overall impact of probability of 
identification; however, it shows that a system can be effective with a low 
probability of identification as long as the system provides the capability for 
multiple identification opportunities. 
• Probability of Kill 
Has a moderate impact on the overall success of the mission.  It is clear that the 
probability of kill has a direct correlation to the overall success.  This makes sense 
since depending on the maximum engagement range; the SUTRS may only have 
the opportunity to engage a target one time.  If it can only engage one time it is 
absolutely critical that the probability of kill is very high.   
If the SUTRS has the opportunity to engage multiple times, either through the use 
of a long engagement range or high speed engagement system, it is very possible 
that a low probability of kill could be successful.  The problem with this situation 
is that the cost of each engagement would go up since multiple engagements 
would be required.  This will be discussed in more detail in later sections. 
• Detection Range 
This is by far the most critical attribute.  This is shown by the very steep curve in 
the MEP.  This correlation is in line with all of the stakeholder conversations and 
resources that the SUTRS engineering team has seen.  This makes sense since 
detection range is the first attribute in the linear engagement kill chain.  Due to the 
high impact of this attribute, detailed discussion on interactions with other 
attributes will be in later sections.  
• Engagement Range 
Has a critical impact on the overall success of the mission.  The engagement 
range is very critical since the speed of engagement only allows for a limited 
number of engagements based on the maximum engagement range.  When the 
engagement range is extended, more engagements are possible which leads to an 
improvement in mission success. 
• Engagement Time 
Has minimal impact on the overall success of the mission.  The time it takes to 
engage a target has a logical connection to the overall success of the mission since 
faster engagement times allow for the detonation of the mine at a longer distance, 
as well as more engagements if necessary.  That being said, the results of the 
modeling and simulation show that the overall success of the mission is impacted 
only slightly when comparing shorter times to engage, but that high engagement 
times (i.e. 20.0 seconds) is not sufficient for the purposes of MCM operations in 
the manner in which they have been modeled. 
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• False Alarm Rate  
Has a minimal impact on the overall success of the mission.  This is seen by the 
lack of a trend in the data.  Logically, there is a point at which false alarm rate 
would have an impact, but for the range that was modeled, there was no 
significant impact.  The true impact that a high false alarm rate would have on the 
overall success of the mission is the “shots fired” at benign targets.  In a real 
world situation, the depth of the magazine (available “shots”) would drive the 
requirement for false alarm rate, but due to the limitations in this model this type 
of analysis was postponed until a conceptual solution is identified.   
• Sensor Cycle Time 
Has a significant impact on the overall success of the mission.  This is shown by 
the distinct trend in the data.  This makes sense since the lower the cycle time, the 
more chances the sensor has to detect an object.  The more chances that SUTRS 
has to detect mines, the better the odds are to actually detect them; overall mission 
success follows based on this. 
• Approach Speed 
Has moderate impact on the overall success of the mission.  There is a distinct 
difference between the overall mission success for an approach speed of 5 and 
10kts; there is less of a difference between 10 and 20kts.  This shows that speeds 
below 10kts and preferably at or below 5kts will contribute to the overall success 
of the mission.   
There is a distinct tradeoff that is made with this.  A slower approach time 
provides for an increased overall mission success, but then reduces the cycle time 
requirements for all other attributes.  This is a commonly understood concept in 
the MCM world.  In current operations, when a ship finds itself in a minefield 
they will come to a near complete stop until all supporting systems have a chance 
to identify and mitigate any and all targets.  In the types of mission sets described 
in the SUTRS Design Reference Mission, time is a critical attribute and it is 
assumed in the modeling program that the ship is not willing to stop completely 
due to the urgency of their mission. 
It is important to note that since this was a Taguchi DOE rather than a full 
factorial DOE this analysis is only done to a level at which the attributes can be described 
as having a major impact or minor impact.  For true performance data for level of 
attribute and each combination a full factorial DOE would be conducted.  This is not 
necessary for this type of analysis since the end goal of the SUTRS modeling and 




c. Response Surfaces and Attribute Interactions 
Since many attributes were modeled in the SUTRS Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) program it is critical to not only discuss the impact of individual 
attributes, but the interactions of multiple attributes.  This interaction analysis provides 
for the identification of a technical trade space.  For example, if sensor cycle time is 
increased, then probability of detection may be reduced.  This and other examples will be 
discussed below. 
(1) Interaction Plots.  Since we know that some factors did not 
influence the overall success of the mission, based on the main effects analysis, these will 
be excluded from the interactions plot analysis.  Since multiple attributes were identified 
to have some impact and there is a logical association between some of these attributes, 
these relationships will be explored to identify the tradespace between them.   
The first example is the interaction between Sensor Cycle Time 
and Probability of Detection.  The following figure shows the surface plot for these two 
attributes as they relate to the probability of the ship being hit by the mine. 
From this point of view on the surface plot it is clear that the 
sensor cycle time must be below 1 second when combined with a relatively low 
probability of detection. 
 










Surface Plot of Hit vs Prob. Detection, Sensor Cycle Time
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Figure 26.    Surface Plot 2 (P(D) and Sensor Cycle Time) 
From this point of view it is clear that a higher probability of 
detection will allow for slower sensor cycle rates.  It also shows that at fast sensor cycle 
rates, the probability of detection is not nearly as important.   
To explore this pairing further, a contour plot was generated and is 















Figure 27.   Contour Plot (P(D) and Sensor Cycle Time) 
This contour plot shows the same data as the 3-Dimensional (3-D) 
surface plots above, but with a color coding to represent the different Z-axis values (the 
Z-axis refers to probability of being hit by the mine).  This contour plot makes it 
absolutely clear that a high probability of detection is critical to mission success; it also 
shows that a relatively low probability of detection is acceptable when combined with a 
fast sensory cycle rate.  For the following examples only a contour plot will be presented 
as it is the most effective at showing the overall attribute interactions. 
The next example of attribute interactions is the interaction 
between probability of detection and probability of identification. The following figure 
shows a contour plot for probabilities of detection and identification as they relate to 




































Figure 28.   Contour Plot (P(D) and P(ID)) 
This contour plot shows that a relatively low probability of 
detection can be balanced by a high probability of identification and that a low 
probability of identification can be balanced by a high probability of detection.  This 
makes sense since these are time sensitive cyclical attributes and the more cycles it takes 
to detect the object, the fewer opportunities the SUTRS will have to identify it.   
One artifact of this plot that is not expected is the portion in the 
upper right corner where both probabilities are high.  It was expected that this 
combination would lead to a low probability of the ship being hit.  This artifact is 
attributed to the Taguchi DOE and that there is less data available at extreme 
combinations of attributes.  Future modeling efforts should revisit this combination. 
The following contour plot shows the interaction of Detection 
Range and Engagement Range as they relate to the probability of the ship being hit by the 



































Figure 29.   Contour Plot (Engagement Range and Detection Range) 
This contour plot simply shows that as long as the detection range 
is significantly high that the engagement range can be relatively low.  The opposite is not 
true.  The SUTRS could not engage a target until it detects it. 
The following figure shows the contour plot for Engagement 





































Figure 30.    Contour Plot (Engagement Range and Engagement Time) 
This contour plot shows that when combined, the engagement time 
is relatively insignificant as compared to the engagement range.  This means that as long 
as a SUTRS solution can engage at a distance, the timeliness of the engagement is of 
minimal impact. 
The following figure shows the contour plot for Engagement Time 
and Probability of Kill as they relate to the probability of the ship being hit by a mine. 
 



























































Contour Plot of Hit vs Prob. Kill, Engagement Time
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This plot shows that a moderate probability of kill could be 
acceptable when combined with a faster engagement time.  This plot does not show a 
lower probability of being hit when the engagement time is low and the probability of kill 
is high; this is an unanticipated artifact of this modeling.  This is attributed to the lack of 
data at the extreme attribute interaction pairings due to the Taguchi DOE. 
The final example of attribute interaction is the combination of 
Detection Range and Approach Speed.  This interaction is shown in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32.   Contour Plot (Approach Speed and Detection Range) 
This contour plot shows that as long as detection range is high, a 
ship should be able to proceed at a higher speed with minimal risk to the ship. 
4. Discussion on Data Model Variability 
The statistical nature of the MCM functions of Probability of Detection (Pd), 
Probability of Identification (Pi) and Probability of Kill (Pk) requires that the integrated 
model also demonstrate statistical variability in the mission success metrics.  Both the 
ExtendSim® and CORESim® models have introduced statistical variance into the data 
model in the form of normal distributions and the following discussion elaborates on the 




































According to Beasty (2007), the effectiveness of a piece of detection 
equipment can be represented by the discrete binomial probability distribution. The 
binomial distribution can only be applied to the detection of a mine as a single event, 
either successful or unsuccessful. For multiple events, the limit of the Binomial 
distribution as the number of events goes to infinity is the Poisson distribution, and using 
the theory of large numbers and Chebyshev’s theorem, we can assume the limit of the 
Poisson distribution approaches the Normal distribution. It is the Normal distribution on 
which we will depend most heavily for the model simulation.  
In the following section we discuss the justification and applicability of 
the probability distributions. The variability of Pd and Pi for a target is due to a number of 
factors that affect the functional capability of MCM detection and identification resources 
(Beasty 2007); (PEO (MUW) 2000).  
Environmental Factors that affect detection and identification include but 
are not limited to the following: 
• Water depth 
• Bottom topography 
• Bottom composition 
• Reverberation 
• Sea state 
• Clutter (fish, detritus) 
• Water clarity 
• Water density 
• Underwater obstacles 
• Currents 




• Thermal layering 
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• Magnetic environment 
• Background noise (acoustic neutrality) 
• Pressure 
Target physical factors that affect detection and identification include but 
are not limited to the following: 
• Type of mine (bottom dwelling, moored, floating, buried) 
• Size of mine 
• Composition of mine 
• Aspect angle and apparent aperture to detection equipment 
• Performance factors of the detection equipment also contribute to the 
variability of detection and identification and include but are not 
limited to the following: 
• Navigational errors 
• Target Circular Error Probability (CEP) 
• Twice Distance to target Root Mean Square Error 
Each of these listed errors has a characteristic statistical distribution and 
these in turn have an accumulated effect on the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve 
(ROC) that allows the mine hunter to discriminate between an actual target and a false 
positive indication (Fuller 2012). Because each of the listed factors has a characteristic 
distribution, and each of these distributions is convolved forming an aggregate 
distribution, we apply Chebyshev’s theorem of statistical approximation to simplify the 
model assumptions and represent the aggregate distribution as a normal distribution.  
5. Detection 
Because current mine identification processes rely heavily on visual identification 
at close range, there are fewer variables that provide statistical impacts, but at a cost of 
time. As automated processes become more prevalent, the number of statistical variables 
and their impact will increase. This section will focus on the statistical variability of mine 




According to Thompson and Bell (1997), an average signal to noise energy ratio 
(SNR) of approximately 12 dB is desired to adequately discriminate a target of interest 
from the background noise and signal variation generated by the various factors listed 
above. 
The 2-way sonar equation is similar in form to the 2-way radar equation (Minkoff 
2002).  If the confounding factors are accumulated as Noise (Nc), and the energy of the 
return signal from the mine-like object is Ms, we have in equation form: 
      





𝑀𝑠 = 𝑃𝑡∗𝐺𝑡∗𝑣2∗𝜑(4𝜋∗𝑅)2∗𝑓2 (10) 
 
Where: 
Ms: Mine return signal 
power 
Nc: Accumulated noise 
power 
 
φ: mine cross-sectional 
aperture factor 
 
Pt: Sonar Transmitter power 
 
Gt: gain of transmitter 
aperture 
 
Gr: gain of receiver 
aperture 
 
R: Range from mine 
 
v: velocity of sound 
underwater 
f: frequency of the 
transmitted signal 
 
    𝑁𝑐 = 𝐹 (𝑁𝑑,𝑃,𝑇,𝑁𝑚,𝐷𝑠, … )         (11) 
Where: 
Nd: Environmental 

















6. Two Sphere Model 
Detection in sonar world is a complex function that in its basic form includes 
parameters of wavelength, power, sonar cross section or apparent aperture of the target, 
and apparent aperture or gain of the receiver. Apparent aperture and distance from target 
can add non-linearly to power transmitted reflected and received. We can imagine the 
statistical interaction between a detection system such as sonar, and a mine-like object, 
by developing a simple 2-sphere model. Such a model allows us to visualize the effects of 
range, target aperture size, and noise.  
Looking at Figure 33 we will represent the sonar system as being at the center of 
sphere- 1 and the target or mine-like object as the center of sphere-2. The radius of 
sphere-1 is the maximum detection range of the sonar as described by equation (1). The 
radius of sphere-2 corresponds to the effective aperture of the target.  
 
 
Figure 33.   Sonar System at Center 
 




Figure 35.   New Effective Range 
The intersection of the two spheres represents the effective detected aperture of a 
target. The detection range of the sonar represented by sphere-1 will exhibit statistical 
variability due to the environmental factors listed above.   
The effective aperture of the target represented by sphere-2 will exhibit statistical 
variability due to the target physical factors listed above. It is important to note that 
frequency resonance of an object is a multiple of the half-wavelength of sound as 
opposed to the quarter-wavelength of an electromagnetic aperture. The target aperture 
will also exhibit statistical variability due to the environmental factors listed above but 
we can assume for the simplified model that this variability can be included in the 
variability exhibited by sphere-1. 
The minimum intersection between two spheres of any size is a point. This is the 
absolute maximum detection range for our model but may not be within a detection 
threshold. Detection threshold corresponds to the ratio of the surface area of intersection 
to the surface area of sphere-1. The area of intersection is approximately {cosine (θ1/2) x 
θ1} steradians. 
From (Thompson and Bell 1997), we desire an SNR of approximately 12 dB. In 
order to gain this level of increase in a static environment, we would need to reduce our 
range to target by one-half (Minkoff 2002). This reduction in range is depicted in Figure 
34 In order to regain the minimum area of intersection; the target sphere must be moved 
inside the maximum range until it intersects the new effective range depicted in Figure 
35. The effective area of intersection for the maximum range is now {cosine (θ2/2) x θ2} 





ratio of aperture areas to maximum detection area can be quite significant and actual the 
detection threshold of a mine-like object can fall anywhere between these values 
depending on the characteristic environment.   
The key lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that the probability of 
detection of a mine-like object is a sliding variable that has values from 0.00 to 1.00 and 
that depends on many factors outside of the control of the mine hunter. It is both 
insufficient and incorrect to state that the probability of detection will be a fixed value. 
Our models therefore correctly incorporate an approximation of this variability vice using 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS  
The SUTRS Engineering Team selected the AHP as an aid to determine a 
preferred system configuration during the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AHP 
process utilizes a weighting system based on verbal declaratives instead of operational 
metrics for Operational Measures of Effectiveness (OMOE)s. (Martens and Rempel 
2010) (Hootman and Whitcomb 2005) 
The rationale for taking this approach is that the system proposed (1) does not 
currently exist in any form; and (2) the system will require an investment in either 
developing new technologies or enhancing existing technologies. Because of these 
factors, no hard metrics are currently available that might be utilized for the development 
of a deterministic OMOE. 
The AHP process was facilitated through the use of modeling within CORESim® 
and ExtendSim®. The CORESim® model was able to produce a scalable event timeline 
that demonstrated the use of series and parallel operation functions that provided insight 
into the flow of activities and could be used to indicate where time sequences needed to 
demonstrate efficiency gains. These models are described in Section III of this report.  
For example, the identification time increment is the source of significant lag in the kill 
chain and is identified as an area where technology needs significant development. The 
ExtendSim® model was able to incorporate statistical parameters of platform performance 
relative to subsystem performance in order to determine the dependence sensitivity. This 
provides insights into the minimum required engagement ranges, detection ranges, and 
factors of mission speed that must be considered in the AoA. 
There are many MCM components in the fleet today and others that are in the 
acquisition process. The technologies fall into a couple of families: detection, mine 
hunting, mine sweeping, and platforms that can be equipped with different components 





Table 13.   Mine Detection 
System 
Number 
Name Provider Notes Platform 
AN/AQS-20 Minehunting Sonar 
System 





























AN/SQQ-32 Minehunting Sonar Raytheon Hull-mounted detection 








AN/BLQ-11 Long Term Mine 
Reconnaissance 
System 
Boeing RF and Sonar sensors, 




















UUV with detection 
capabilities in high 
clutter environment, 
fully autonomous and 
does not send data until 














Associates localization of 
minefields & obstacles 
in the surf zone and 






Table 14.   Mine Hunting 
System 
Number 
Name Provider Notes Platform 
AN/AQS-235 Airborne Mine 
Neutralization 
System 
Raytheon Releases BAE 
Archerfish expendable 
UUVs; retargets the 






AN/AQS-232 Airborne Mine 
Neutralizing 
System 
Raytheon (larger version of 
AN/AQS-235 for MH-





AN/AWS-2 RAMICS Northrop 
Grumman 








Table 15.   Mine Sweeping 
System 
Number 




 Acoustic and 
magnetic sweep 
Avenger Class 
(PEO LCS n.d.) 






















System Name Provider Notes Platform 

































Table 16.   Unmanned Platforms Used with MCM Systems 
System Name Provider Notes Platform 
Unmanned Surface 
Vehicle (USV)  
Oregon Iron 
Works 
Unmanned 11m rigid-hull 













submersible, high endurance, 





States Navy Fact 
File 2011) 
MQ-8B FireScout Northrop 
Grumman 
Helicopter UAV that can be 









Mine countermeasure missions have traditionally been undertaken by a dedicated 
group of MCM vessels. There are 14 Avenger class MCM ships in the fleet today and 
have home ports in San Diego, CA., Japan, and Bahrain. (United States Navy Fact File 
2012) (Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet n.d.) The Avenger class is 
capable of both mine-hunting and mine-sweeping. If the ships are required by the fleet 
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away from their home-port they are transported by container vessel to the mission area 
(Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet n.d.). This causes huge delays in 
responding to real or potential threats. The Avenger Class MCM ships are equipped with 
SLQ-37, SLQ-38, SLQ-48, SQQ-32 mine detecting, hunting, and sweeping technologies 
(Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems 2012). The newest addition to the Navy MCM 
strategy is the MCM mission module for the Littoral Combat Ship, LCS. The central idea 
behind the LCS is its mission modules. There are three mission modules currently in 
development: Surface Warfare (SuW), MCM, and Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW). 
(International Defense Review 2012) Every LCS ship will be equipped with a mission 
module depending on the mission/situation. The mission modules will be easily 
exchangeable even in a forward location. (Jane's Navy International 2011). For example 
an LCS ship will be able to exchange their SuW mission module to a MCM module if 
mines are a threat in their environment. The MCM module will include the systems listed 
in Table 17. 
Table 17.   System in LCS MCM Mission Module (International Defense Review 2012) 
System Quantity 
USV (with USSS)  1 
RMMV  2 
AN/AQS-20A 3 
MH-60S (with OASIS, AMNS, ALMDS) 1 
Fire Scout VTUAV  (with COBRA)  1 
Knifefish (expected delivery 2017)  1 
 
This mission module gives the LCS the capabilities to search, sweep, and hunt 
from the air, the water, and underwater. These technologies include a wide range of 
MCM approaches but it is far from constant “in-stride” detection and avoidance/removal. 
The LCS mission module is a huge step from the limited number of dedicated MCM 





module has an expected delivery date of February 2013, unless otherwise noted and will 
be followed by future increments in technology and system development (International 
Defense Review 2012) (Jane's Navy International 2011). 
1. CORE®ExtendSim® 
Based on this research, there are currently 4 basic MCM technology 
configurations; 1) Airborne MCM, 2) Ship-based MCM, 3) Unmanned 
Surface/Underwater Vehicles, and 4) Organic System of Systems which utilizes an 
optimized combination of the other three independent configurations.  In order to 
determine the most operationally feasible MCM configuration or alternative, the team 
decided to use the AHP.  AHP is a method used by decision makers to determine the 
relative importance of attributes, and also to compare how well the options perform on 
the different attributes (Wright 2009).  
AHP provides a means of converting qualitative attributes into quantitative 
scores, which are then used to conduct 1-to-1 pair-wise comparisons between 
incrementally selected configuration options.  Since this analysis utilized 
UNCLASSIFIED sources to research these MCM technologies, specific performance 
metrics, capabilities, and limitations data were either very limited or non-existent.  This 
lack of data forced the SUTRS analysis team to correlate open source commentary 
regarding the various MCM systems to develop an aggregate understanding the 
capabilities of each of these four basic configurations in order to score each of them 
against the MCM performance criteria established during the SUTRS mission analysis.   
The first step of the AHP is to decompose the decision space into the three basic 
levels of a decision hierarchy; 1) Goal(s), 2) Decision Criteria, and 3) Alternatives.   The 
hierarchy in Figure 36 represents how each alternative configuration can be 
independently assessed against each MCM performance criteria.  This approach allows 

































































Figure 36.   SUTRS AHP Decision Hierarchy 
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As is the case with many multi-objective decisions, the SUTRS optimization 
analysis was conducted using qualitative and subjective input for each configurations 
performance relative to the performance criteria.   The following verbal-to-value scoring 
scale was adapted from the fundamental scale of absolute numbers corresponding to 
verbal comparisons mentioned in the previous section (Section III.A) to develop the 
quantitative rank within each AHP: 
Table 18.   SUTRS AHP Verbal-to-Value Scoring Scale 




Very Good 9 
 
These scores were then applied to the various alternatives relative to performance 
metrics in Table 19.  The verbal scores applied to each basic MCM alternative are the 
result of an aggregate understanding of the current MCM technologies identified by the 
SUTRS MCM technology research effort. 
Table 19.   SUTRS AHP Verbal Scoring 
 
Probability of Detection 
Detection Cycle Rate 
Detection Range 
Probability of Identification 
M
ean Tim
e to Identify 
M
ean Tim
e to Respond 
M
agazine Supply 







Airborne MCM Fair Good Fair Fair Good Very Good Good Good Poor 
Very 
Poor Fair 
Ship Based MCM Good Fair Good Good Good Good Good Fair Good Fair Good 












Pair-wise comparison matrices were then developed for each attribute in order to 
compare and contrast the alternative MCM configurations to each other. After the 
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alternatives are compared to each other relative to the attributes, the performance scores 
are normalized and combined in Table 20.  The weights for each attribute are then 
retrieved from the QFD 2 in order to weigh each alternative. This final weighting ensures 
that the stakeholder’s input is used to rank the alternatives. 











Probability of Identification 
M
ean Tim






















Weighting 0.084 0.066 0.079 0.070 0.065 0.093 0.025 0.030 0.072 0.065 0.100   
Normalized 
weighting 0.112 0.088 0.105 0.094 0.087 0.124 0.033 0.040 0.096 0.086 0.133   
Airborne 
MCM 0.179 0.269 0.192 0.208 0.269 0.281 0.269 0.318 0.125 0.050 0.278 0.217 
Ship Based 
MCM 0.250 0.192 0.269 0.292 0.269 0.219 0.269 0.227 0.292 0.250 0.389 0.271 
USV/UUV 0.250 0.269 0.269 0.208 0.192 0.219 0.115 0.227 0.292 0.350 0.278 0.252 
 SoS 0.321 0.269 0.269 0.292 0.269 0.281 0.346 0.227 0.292 0.350 0.056 0.260 
 
 
According to the Final Weighted Results, the Ship Based MCM configuration 
represented the most optimized MCM configuration based on current MCM capabilities 
and value placed on various performance attributes by MCM stakeholders. 
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The modeling and simulation results described in this report were subject to the 
limitations and constraints described in Section III.E.4.  In order to assess to what degree 
the impacts of those limitations and constraints might confound the results of the research 
described in this report, a sensitivity analysis was performed on each of the parameters 
used in the model.   




𝑦 = 𝑚𝑥 + 𝑏    (12)  
 
Where 
“y” is the overall AHP score given the changed weight. 
“x” is the parameter’s weight (which for the sensitivity analysis will be either 0 or 
1) 
“b” is the AHP score at x = 0. 
“m” is the slope of the line. 
𝑚 =  𝑦1−𝑦0
𝑥1−𝑥0
    (13) 
 
Substituting 1 and 0 into the equation for the values of x, Equation 14Error! 
Reference source not found. transforms to… 
 
𝑚 =  𝑦1 − 𝑦0    (14) 
 
 
And finally, in order to calculate the x-value of the intersection point—a point 
where the y-values of two alternatives is equal— Equation 14 is used, which is derived as 
follows: 
 
𝑦1 = 𝑦2    (15) 
 
 
Substituting Equation 15Error! Reference source not found.… 
 
𝑚1𝑥 + 𝑏1 = 𝑚2𝑥 + 𝑏2   (16)  
 
Isolating “x” on one side of the equality… 
 
𝑏1 − 𝑏2 = 𝑚2𝑥 −𝑚1𝑥   (17) 




𝑥 =  𝑏1−𝑏2
𝑚2−𝑚1
    (18) 
The results of that sensitivity analysis are described in this section. 
1. Probability of Detection 
Figure 37 indicates that the preference of systems shifts from Ship Based MCM to 
a SoS approach at a weight of 0.393.  Given the current weight of 0.084, this would 
constitute a 369% increase in weight.   
 
 
Figure 37.   Probability of Detection  
2. Detection Cycle Rate 
Figure 38 indicates that the preference of systems shifts from Ship Based MCM to 
a SoS approach at a weight of 0.393.  Given the current weight of 0.066, this would 





Figure 38.   Detection Cycle Rate 
3. Detection Range 
Figure 39 indicates that the preferred alternative is insensitive to Detection Range. 
 
 
Figure 39.   Detection Range 
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4. Probability of Identification 
Figure 40 indicates that the preferred alternative is insensitive to Probability of 
Identification. 
 
Figure 40.   Probability of Identification 
5. Mean Time to Identify 






Figure 41.   Mean Time to Identify 
6. Mean Time to Respond 
Figure 42 indicates that the preference of systems shifts from Ship Based MCM to 
a SoS approach at a weight of 0.393.  Given the current weight of 0.093, this would 




Figure 42.   Mean Time to Respond 
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7. Magazine Supply 
Figure 43 indicates that the preference of systems shifts from Ship Based MCM to 
a SoS approach at a weight of 0.277.  Given the current weight of 0.025, this would 
constitute a 1012% increase in weight.   
 
Figure 43.   Magazine Supply 
8. Rate of Fire 
Figure 44 indicates that the preference of systems shifts from Ship Based MCM to 
an Airborne MCM approach at a weight of 0.425.  Given the current weight of 0.040, this 





Figure 44.   Rate of Fire 
9. Engagement Range 
Figure 45 indicates that the preferred alternative is insensitive to Engagement 
Range.   
 
 
Figure 45.   Engagement Range 
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10. Engagement Depth 
Figure 46 indicates that the preference of systems shifts from Ship Based MCM to 
an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV/UUV) approach at a weight of 0.218.  Given the 
current weight of 0.065, this would constitute a 237% increase in weight.   
 
Figure 46.   Engagement Depth 
11. Cost Per Engagement 
Figure 47 indicates that the preference of systems shifts from Ship Based MCM to 
a SoS approach at a weight of 0.113.  Given the current weight of 0.100, this would 
constitute a 13% increase in weight.  Therefore, the preferred alternative is highly 
sensitive to cost.  Before opting for the Ship Based MCM approach, any decision-maker 





Figure 47.   Cost vs. Engagement 
12. Summary 
With the exception of cost per engagement, the sensitivity analysis indicates that 
the preferred alternative does not shift from Ship Based MCM unless the stakeholder 
priorities are increased on the order of hundreds of percent as compared to the current 
values. 
The cost per engagement sensitivity is a very important result as it shows that 
using the AHP process, where cost is an attribute of preference, cost remains a critical 
factor in selection.  In a CAIV analysis, where the characterization of effectiveness would 
be divided by cost of the alternative, it is anticipated that cost would have a more 
profound impact on the preference selection.  Therefore, the sensitivity analysis indicates 
that the Navy should consider both Ship-Based MCM and the System of Systems 
approaches that were described in this chapter in a Cost As Independent Variable (CAIV) 
analysis. 
C. RISK AND COST CONSIDERATIONS 
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines 
programmatic risk as “A measure of the uncertainty of attaining a goal, objective, or 
requirement pertaining to technical performance, cost, and schedule.”(INCOSE 2004)  
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Team Dahlgren assessed these primary components of program risk considering how 
they interact in Figure 48 and identified four specific areas of risk to the realization of an 
MCM point defense capability based on current technical, tactical, and political realities 
discovered during our open-source research.  
 
Figure 48.   Typical Relationship among the Risk Categories (INCOSE 2004) 
Threat Evolution: If mine technologies evolve such that smart, mobile mines 
become effective, then current MCM capabilities may be inadequate.  While mine 
technology has remained simple in design and technique through much of the mine 
warfare age, the recent development and proliferation of MCM technologies in the last 20 
years which enable mine detection, classification, and identification within the U.S. Navy 
have forced the evolution of naval mine triggering and concealment to a new realm of 
undeterred and undetected threats (James D. Bahr 2007). These so called “smart sea 
mines” are specifically designed to counter MCMs which detect classically deployed 
mines, “spoof” classically triggered mines (i.e. target differentiation to select specific 
fleet vessels) (Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Studies Board, National 




































field of mine warfare, non-state actors have begun to present an asymmetric mine warfare 
threat.  In terms of the Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions on mine warfare, asymmetric 
mining would consist of intentional intercepting of commercial shipping or the placement 
of uncontrolled or unmonitored automatic naval mines in any body of internationally 
accessible water(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011).  By employing these non-standard 
mine warfare tactics, small dissident groups would have the ability to greatly inhibit the 
power projection capabilities of the U.S. Navy and international commerce.  
As asymmetrical employment of naval mine technologies and the use of smart 
mine technologies by state and non-state actors increases, the likelihood of non-MCM 
fleet vessels encountering an unmarked minefield or un-cleared mine will also increase. 
In order for an in-stride MCM point defense capability to be realized, mine detection, 
identification, and threat response (avoidance or neutralization) must be available on all 
naval and coast guard vessels rather than just dedicated MCM assets within the naval 
fleet. 
Detection Challenge: If platforms are unable to detect the presence of a mine, 
then point-defense systems will be ineffective against the mine threat.  While mine 
technology is constantly improving in terms of reduced sonar cross-sections and 
detection avoidance through mobility, the effectiveness of these signature reduction 
efforts remain dwarfed in comparison to environmental factors.  In 2001, the Committee 
for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Studies Board, and National Research Council 
identified a few of these key environmental factors which have plagued MCM throughout 
the mine warfare age: 
Bathymetry: The depth, slope, and roughness conditions of the mined waters 
affect the ability of Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel and mechanical 
sweep systems to counter deeply moored or surface laid mines. 
Sound Propagation: Complex thermal distributions and sound velocity profiles 
and losses at the boundaries (bottom and sea surface) significantly affect acoustic 
propagation at the most likely mine locations. 
Bottom Type and Composition: Bottom type (i.e. hard rock, firm sand, soft 
mud) largely determines the levels of bottom reverberation, clutter and roughs, and 
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bottom sediment type and thickness (along with bottom currents) establish the likelihood 
of mine burial and the ability to counter. 
Non-mine Mine-like Bottom Object (NOMBO) Density: Debris and small 
bottom features influence the mine densities perceived by various active sonars.  This 
parameter is sensitive to the characteristics of individual sonars including their spatial 
resolution and signal processing algorithms.  High false alarm rates caused by high 
NOMBO densities will increase the risk of mine activation by reducing the ability to 
utilize more thorough mine hunting techniques due to transit time requirements and being 
forced to employ less thorough mine sweeping techniques. 
Tides and Currents: Currents and tidal conditions can affect the performance of 
divers or remote vehicles, or even the ability of warships to execute controlled, slow-
speed maneuvers to avoid detected objects that may be mines.  Tidal currents and 
turbulence also cause natural fluctuations in pressure that can trigger pressure influence 
mines and promote mine burial, which will inhibit detection and identification. 
Sea State: High sea state and wind conditions can increase ambient noise and 
surface reverberation and clutter; high sea states can also hamper sea keeping and MCM 
operations by limiting certain systems and techniques. 
Water Clarity: Optical sensor performance (airborne or undersea) can vary 
appreciably depending on the optical clarity of the sea, which has a direct impact on laser 
and optical wavelength attenuation. 
Current MCM methodology is heavily reliant on specifically localized 
environmental data, which is captured and evaluated just prior to employing MCM 
systems and techniques.  In order to realize an in stride, MCM point defense capability 
for a non-MCM vessel, either the impact of these environmental factors must be greatly 
reduced through improvements in mine sensor technologies, techniques, and algorithms, 
or environmental characterization technologies, techniques, and algorithms. 
Space-Capability Tradeoff: If mine point-defense capabilities require additional 
space onboard the protected platform, the platforms will have to sacrifice mission critical 
capabilities. In addition to the finite space constraints of equipping a naval warship, task 
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saturation during a multi-axis engagement must also be considered.  Modern warships are 
designed and equipped to simultaneously combat a vast array of threats and complex 
engagement regions to include air, land, surface, and sub-surface.  Despite these 
advancements in critical enabling technologies, the addition of an onboard MCM module 
and mission would inadvertently hinder a naval commander’s ability to achieve sea 
control.  A warship operating in a mined environment without the assistance of dedicated 
off-board MCM systems would have to significantly reduce its operational tempo and 
multi-tasking capabilities in order to safely prosecute mines. (Patrick A. Molenda 2005) 
In order to realize an in-stride MCM point defense capability, the system must not 
inhibit the warship's primary warfighting requirements by either greatly reducing the size, 
weight, and power requirements of current systems or greatly increasing the MCM 
capability to a point that the current technology footprint is acceptable because the newly 
realized capability out weights the footprint burden. LCDR Molenda also suggests that 
risks to an on-board point defense MCM system could be greatly reduced if these systems 
were supported by an appropriately scaled, functional, and networked off-board MCM 
capability (organic MCM via system of systems), which would mean that the large 
portion of the mine threat had been cleared and the point-defense system was only 
charged with singular undetected mine defense. 
MCM Infrastructure: If the U.S. Navy maintains or de-prioritizes MIW/MCM 
budget relative to the Naval table of allowances (TOA), then the threat to Navy platforms 
will grow as the cost of ships grows (or the capability of mines grow).  Since the 1980’s, 
the U.S. Navy has allotted about one to one and a half percent of the Navy TOA to 
MIW/MCM(Scott C. Truver 2012).  While this small apportionment represents an 
obvious constraint on the pace at which MCM technology is developed, it more 
importantly reveals a larger issue of the lack of organizational prioritization, which will 
ultimately dominate the technology developmental curve.  LTG Rhodes and RADM 
Holder dissected the reprioritization/mitigation areas of the Naval apportionment of 
resources to the MIW/MCM effort into the following categories in their future 
warfighting concept for MCM in littoral power projection (Rhodes and Holder 1998).  
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Leadership: The DoN will have to make a substantial investment in the research 
and procurement of the required MCM technologies, infrastructure, connectivity, threat 
and environmental knowledge with an increased consideration towards MCM operational 
tasking, proficiency, maintenance, and sustainment. 
Education and Training: MCM education and training must evolve in two 
distinct and equal directions and in tempo with the deployment of innovative systems.  
First, MCM must be viewed as an equal partner among the traditional naval warfare areas 
and receive the necessary staffing and resources.  Second, future MCM systems will 
employ state of the art technology, which will increase the necessary technical 
competency required to operate and maintain these systems. 
Doctrine: Current MCM doctrine has remained largely unaltered since World 
War II, while all other naval warfare areas and elements have greatly increased in speed 
of maneuver and breadth of capabilities.  In order to maintain pace with the future non-
MCM naval capabilities, MCM technology will have to increase processing power by 
automating and streamlining the MCM kill chain.  This introduction of technology and 
process will also require that the MCM lexicon be revised. 
Material: Future MCM capabilities will require that the industrial and 
governmental technical/scientific communities be heavily engaged and resourced to 
develop effective, low cost, maintainable, modular, and flexible systems.  Once material 
solutions or techniques or discovered to be effective, it is also incumbent upon the MCM 
community to protect and control the critical components and knowledge in order to limit 
the adversary’s ability to counter the counter measure. 
Organization:  In order for fleet commanders to take advantage of organic MCM 
capabilities, the organization must be highly responsive, interoperable, and adaptive to 
changes in the operational situation and intent. In keeping pace with the non-MCM 
warfighting areas, effective C4I must allow MCM functions to be performed as a reach-





Aside from the specific goal of achieving a capability to provide in-stride vessel 
protection through point-defense MCM, the need for U.S. forces to flatten the time vs. 
risk operational curve depicted in Figure 49 continues to drive the MIW/MCM 
community as it has been since the dawn of MIW. 
 
Figure 49.   Future Operational Capabilities Goals - Time vs. Risk (Rhodes and Holder 1998) 
To evaluate the contribution of mine point-defense to this risk vs. time trade-off.  
The team modeled the threshold and objective values varying the ship’s approach speed.  
The results of this analysis are described in Table 21. 
Table 21.   Speed vs. Performance 
 
Speed Threshold Objective
3 kts 3.00% 0.00%
5 Kts 3.80% 0.00%
10 Kts 32.40% 0.00%
20 kts N/A 0.00%
40 kts N/A 0.20%
60 kts N/A 2.40%




Table 21 shows that based on the approach speeds that are required for a specific 
set of missions—currently platforms traverse suspected minefields at roughly 5 knots 
(Fuller 2012)—a system that meets threshold values would be acceptable.  However, as 
the protected platform increases its speed the risk increases by 1000% for a 50% 
reduction in time. 
Operational risk and time to maneuver is mitigated through the optimal 
combination of technology and organization.    Any developmental effort to advance 
MCM technologies will have to develop a robust integrated risk management plan, which 
leverages operational requirements, organizational resources, and technical capabilities to 
mitigate the inherent programmatic risks that, though well defined, continue to plague the 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 107 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
This report documents research and analysis whose intent was to determine 
whether organic mine point-defense is a feasible solution to the mine threats.  The 
analyses evaluated stakeholder preferences; modeled platform survivability under various 
performance characteristics; and compared technical parameters looking for interactions 
between parameters.  The results of the analysis identified that system performance is 
constrained by accurate mine detection.   
The Analytic Hierarchy Process analysis (IV.A) resulted in the recommendation 
that either a combination of shipboard, unmanned, and aerial systems connected in a 
System of Systems approach (as is the concept for LCS MCM MP) or a dedicated 
shipboard self-defense capability would be the optimum configuration for addressing 
organic mine point-defense.  However, these configurations, using current technologies, 
would be constrained by fidelity of small-object detection underwater, and system cost. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How do Varying Navy Missions Impact Mine Point-Defense Strategy? 
Four different projected operational scenarios were identified in this paper: Ship 
to Objective Maneuver; Transmitting Sea Lines of Communication; Joint Forcible Entry 
Operations; and Advance Clandestine Reconnaissance.  The similarities in these missions 
are that the threatened platform must enter and traverse a mined area.  The differences in 
the varying missions are number and size of protected platforms; and operational tempo. 
The Advance Clandestine Reconnaissance mission may require defense of a 
single small, high-speed manned craft (such as an 8m RHIB); whereas the Transiting Sea 
Lines of Communications may require defense of multiple large destroyers, cruisers, 
carriers, etc.  As a result, organic point defense needs to be a reliable, scalable, 
transportable capability with a short response time.   
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2. What is a Cost Effective Anti-Mine System?  
The cost of mines can be expressed in two ways.  First, the mines have a direct, 
monetary cost.  When looking at the effectiveness of a mine as a mechanism for 
economic warfare, the analyst must compare the cost of the damaged platform (in the 
case of an incident) to the cost of the mine; or the analyst must compare the cost of the 
resources required to defeat the mine to the cost of the mine, itself.   
This team’s research was unable to obtain cost data for current mine 
countermeasure technologies; however, the PEO LCS MCM engineer with whom we 
consulted,  indicated that no current MCM system competes with mines for cost 
effectiveness. 
The second type of cost is a subjective valuation of ‘access’.  The value of access 
to certain strategic areas has the ability to offset the cost deficiency of mine operations 
(for example, prohibiting access to a major sea-base can have the effect of denying 
resupply to a combat force in a prolonged campaign); therefore, there are plausible 
scenarios where the value of the objective justifies the direct cost of the mine operations.  
This research was unable to provide an objective goal for the cost of mine defense 
systems, due to the limitations of current mine detection systems and the lack of 
availability of mine operation cost data.  Nevertheless, mine defense opportunities must 
set cost efficiency as a top priority.   
3. What are the Critical Attributes (and Critical Attribute Thresholds) 
for System Success? 
The critical attributes that were identified throughout this project are listed in the 
table below.  These attributes were used throughout the project in the QFD development 
as well as the modeling and simulation efforts.  Given a platform speed of 5 knots and a 







Table 22.   Critical Attributes 
Attribute Threshold Objective
Prob. Detection 0.4 0.6
Prob. Identification 0.6 0.8
Prob. Kill 0.6 0.75
Detection Range (m) 200 1000
Engagement Range (m) 100 500
Engagement Time (s) 2 0.5
False Alarm Rate 0.02 0.005
Sensor Cycle Time (s) 5 0.25  
 
Along with the attribute identification, the SUTRS engineering team developed 
Threshold and Objective values for each.  The Threshold and Objective values were 
derived from the M&S efforts once the main effects analysis was conducted.  The goal of 
developing the Threshold and Objective values is to provide acceptable performance 
levels for each attribute as well as an ideal performance level.  This provides a tradespace 
for the system developers and program office to work within.  This tradespace is realized 
through the risk to the ship as well as the speed at which the ship can travel safely.  This 
risk vs. time tradeoff is discussed in another research question. 
4. How can “Layered” Mine Defense Improve Anti-Mine Operations’ 
Risk vs. Time Tradeoff?   
The concept of layered defense is not new, but analysis on how it impacts mine 
defense has not been fully explored.  This question was addressed through the M&S 
efforts.  Several ship speeds were input into the model along with the Threshold and 
Objective values for each attribute identified in research question III.  Each combination 
of attributes and speeds was run through the model 500 times in order to have some 






Table 23.   Speed vs. Performance 
 
Note that speeds above 10 kts were not modeled with the Threshold values due to 
the high probability of being hit by a mine.  This shows that based on the approach 
speeds that are required for a specific set of missions, a system that meets threshold 
values would be acceptable.  However, if high rates of transit are required for a particular 
mission, then a point defense s system that meets objective values would reduce risk to 
the platform as a component of a layered defense model.  Note that these values pertain 
to a situation where a mine is present and should not be considered an overall attrition 
rate.  The risk of encountering a mine is mitigated in most situations by mine hunting and 
mine sweeping efforts that would occur before the SUTRS enabled ship enters the area.  
But currently, the application of mine point-defense does not improve upon the current 
technology’s risk vs. time tradespace. 
5. How will Future Mine Technologies Drive MCM Technology 
Development? 
In many ways, this report is an answer to this question.  Section I.D.3 discussed 
the current state of mine technologies and underwater threats based on bottom 
topography.  In the current environment, bottom dwelling mines are the most difficult to 
properly prosecute (due to the inability to differentiate mines from bottom objects such as 
rocks) (Thompson and Bell 1997) as compared to mines suspended in the water column.  
Regardless, the current environment involves the platform approaching the mine.  In the 
future, mines will approach the platform.  For this type of environment, the currently 




3 kts 3.00% 0.00%
5 Kts 3.80% 0.00%
10 Kts 32.40% 0.00%
20 kts N/A 0.00%
40 kts N/A 0.20%
60 kts N/A 2.40%




the platform will require an ability to defeat the mine before it impacts the hull—point-
defense—or the platform will require the ability to divert the attack to a non-threatening 
area—spoofing.   
Therefore, given the results of the analyses described in this report, the 
development of future mine countermeasure systems would best benefit in sharing in the 
research into emerging underwater detection opportunities, such as the dolphin-esque 
capability to identify objects in the water through the use of pitch variations and non-
linear math [need citation]. (Viegas 2012) 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is the recommendation of this report, given the cost of new system development 
and minimal impact to the risk vs. time tradeoff achieved through technologies modeled 
in this report, that the Navy continue to investigate the feasibility of new underwater 
technologies prior to substantially changing the Navy’s development strategy for mine 
countermeasures.  Additionally, given the criticality of the detection capability identified 
in the modeling and simulation efforts, it is recommended that the Navy specifically 
focus on improvements to small-object detection in the water column, because without 
improvements to the most critical aspect of mine point-defense, it is anticipated that the 
increase to platform survivability will not outweigh the sacrificed mission capabilities.   
It should also be noted that the future of mine technologies would result in an 
environment where mines can approach the platform, instead of the current environment 
where the platform approaches the mine.  This evolution could necessitate point-defense 
systems, as hunting and sweeping will not be sufficient for defending against a mobile 
mine threat. Therefore the future of mine countermeasures should include point-defense 
capabilities. 
With this realization in mind, it is the recommendation of this report that the Navy 
should investigate the feasibility of improvements in the following three technological 
areas of opportunity: 
1. High resolution 3-D sonars (or bathymetry sonars) capable of defining small 
objects at ranges greater than 100 meters. 
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 High resolution 3-D sonars; often referred to as bathymetry sonars; capable of 
defining features of less than 2 inches are commercially available from a number of 
vendors but are very limited in terms of output power and range; typically tens of meters. 
For example one major vendor, BlueView Technologies™ Inc. produces and distributes a 
compact 3-D sonar; Model 2250-45; with resolution of less than 2 inches but which has a 
range of only 10 meters. (Blue View Technologies 2011) 
The Office of Naval Research in June 2010 awarded a contract to BlueView 
Technologies™ Inc. to produce an enhanced version of this sonar model. (Blue View 
Technologies, Inc 2010) Performance metrics for this sonar were not available but the 
technology foundation is promising and investment in this capability should be 
continued. 
2. Advanced digital signal processing algorithms that can provide detection and 
near optical resolution of fully-buried mine-like objects. 
 The Office of Naval Research provided a grant to Dr. David Pierson from North 
Carolina State University who demonstrated a unique approach to sonar imaging of 
buried objects in 2004. The novel approach used time domain signal reversal of a 
received target signal to “re-ping” a target and thereby provide a higher resolution sonar 
return. (Breakthrough Mine-Detection Turns Ocean Floor 'Transparent' 2004) No further 
information on the application of this technique was found but it does provide some 
insights into novel methods that in consideration of greater available processing power 
could, with focused investment, result in the acquisition of a key capability.   
3. Low cost underwater kinetic systems that can engage submerged targets. 
 The RAMICS system identified earlier in the AoA is a kinetic mine engagement 
system deployed against surface or near-surface mines. The system uses a high velocity 
super-cavitating projectile that penetrates the mine casing to disable or destroy the mine. 
The system is deployed from a UH-60 helicopter, and because of the danger from the 
potential explosion, has not been widely utilized.  
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Despite the RAMICS system shortcomings, the concept of a super-cavitating 
ballistic has potential for further development as a fully underwater kinetic engagement 
capability. 
Conversations with NUWC research scientists indicate that a number of 
promising kinetic kill system technology concepts for use against underwater munitions, 
while not currently available, are being researched. (Lead, NUWC Newport Innovative 
Technologies 2012) Among these technology concepts are super-cavitating hydro-
ballistics; projectiles that would utilize an underwater gun system; and super-cavitating 
pulsed water-jet systems that could be employed on small UUVs.  
Super-cavitating hydro-ballistics could support a fast response kill system that is 
effective at ranges over 100 meters. The super-cavitating pulsed water-jet systems have 
slower response times and require the UUV to operate at close ranges; less than one 
meter. (NUWCDIVNPT Technology Proposal 2012) However, with the exception of 
onboard power, these jet systems would have a virtually unlimited magazine. Funding 
would have to be obtained in order to further progress in these areas. 
4. Advanced non-linear echolocation techniques capable of detecting small 
objects in turbulence. 
Due to the cost realities of mine warfare, it is the recommendation of this report 
that the Navy should seek commercial applications of these capabilities in the interest of 
sharing costs with corporate partners.  
As we project into the future of mine warfare capabilities, current MCM practices 
and capabilities will not keep pace with the operational capability of naval mine 






























A. ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The SUTRS system will be required to operate in various oceanic environments. 
Definitions of these oceanographic characteristics are adapted from (OPNAVINST 
3500.38B/MCO 3500.26A/USCG COMDTINST M3500.1B 2007) and are provided in 
Table 25. 
Table 25. Environmental Characteristics 
Environmental 
Element 
Element Definition Element  
Sea Those factors associated 
with the continuous salt 
water ocean system to 
include oceans, seas, gulfs, 
inlets, bays, sounds, straits, 
channels, and rivers. 
Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 NM 
of land) 
Littoral (Coastal, (within 5 NM of land areas) 
Riverine (inland from the littoral terrain to 
include rivers, canals, and delta areas 
connected to landlocked waters) 
Ocean Waters Primary bodies of salt water 
that are not landlocked. 
Atlantic (North and South) 
Pacific (North and South) 
Indian 
Arctic 
Ocean Depth The depth of ocean water at 
a point or for an area. 
Very shallow (<50 fathoms) 
Shallow (50 to 100 fathoms) 
Limited (100 to 500 fathoms) 
Deep (500 to 2500 fathoms) 
Very deep (> 2500 fathoms) 
Ocean Currents A steady, generally 
predictable flow, present 
either in open ocean waters 
or in 
littoral coastal ocean waters. 
Strong (> 3 knots) 
Moderate (1 to 3 knots) 
Little or no (< 1 knot) 
Sea State Roughness of seas caused 
by wind or disturbances. 
Calm to slight (Beaufort Force < 5, Sea State 
3 or less, seas 4 ft 
or less) 
Moderate (Beaufort Force 5, Sea State 4, seas 
4-8 ft) 
Rough (Beaufort Force 6-7, Sea State 5-6, 
seas 8-16 ft) 
Very Rough (Beaufort Force 8-9, Sea State 6, 
seas 17-20) 





Element Definition Element  
30 ft) 
Extremely rough (Beaufort Force above 10, 
Sea State above 7, seas above 30 ft) 
Ocean 
Temperature 
Water surface temperature 
(degrees Fahrenheit). 
Extremely cold (< 35 F) 
Cold (35 to 55 F) 
Moderate (56 to 75 F) 
Warm (> 75 F) 
Saline Content Level of salt content in 
water (parts per thousand). 
Low (< 25 0/00) 
Average (25 to 35 0/00) 
High (> 35 0/00) 
Ocean Features Features just above, just 
below, or within 10 fathoms 
of the ocean surface to 
include islands, atolls, reefs, 
shoals, rocks, or icebergs. 
 
Large raised (islands) 
Small raised (atolls, reefs) 
Small submerged (rocks, icebergs) 
Large submerged (shoals, subsurface reefs) 
 
Sea Room Availability of space for 
maritime maneuver. 
Includes dynamic factors 
such as confining ice, 
submerged wrecks, or 
potentially damaging 
floating objects such as 
logs. Applies especially to 
coastal polar, littoral, or 
riverine environments. 
Unrestricted (open ocean) 
Moderate (some confining factors) 
Confined (coastal and riverine waters) 
Ocean 
Acoustics 




such as sound propagation 
path, layer depth, and 
propagation loss (but 
excluding sea state, ambient 
noise and other factors 
covered separately in this 
section) that affect the 
ability to detect objects. 
Good (subsurface detection systems operate 
effectively in the acoustic environment) 
Fair (systems moderately degraded by 
acoustic conditions) 





Emission of visible light by 
living marine organisms. 
 
Bright (significantly enhances visibility near 
water surface) 
Noticeable (provides some additional light 
near water surface) 
No 





Element Definition Element  
and Eddies significant discontinuities in 
the water mass, such as 
horizontal temperature 
gradient, which significantly 
alter the pattern of ocean 
acoustics. Eddies are 
circular fronts that have 
broken off from a strong 
front such as the Gulf 
Stream. 
major impact on the ability to detect 
subsurface objects) 






The maximum distance 
objects can be seen at the 
depth which underwater 
operations are being 
conducted. 
Zero (<1 foot) 
Poor (1-5 feet) 
Fair (6-10 feet) 
Good (11-50 feet) 
Excellent (51-200 feet) 
Unlimited (>200 feet) 
Ocean Bottom The characteristics of the 
sea bottom. 
Regular (no significant features) 
Irregular (sea bottom irregularities) 
Sea Bottom 
Contours 
Gradient of the seabed. 
 
Flat (floors of ocean basins, plains) 
Gentle (continental shelf) 
Moderate (ridges, fracture zones) 




Seabed material from the 







Water level at low tide. 
 
Deep (> 60 ft) 
Moderate (30 to 60 ft) 





Moving water caused by 
tidal change and river 
runoff. 
 
Fast (> 3 knots) 
Moderate (1 to 3 knots) 
Negligible (< 1 knot) 
Coastal 
Characteristics 
Characteristics of the shore 
area, including contiguous 
waters and land areas. 
 
Harsh (difficult grades, surfaces, inshore 
currents extensive obstacles) 
Moderate (moderate grades, currents some 
obstacles) 




Slope of the beach, from 
low tide up to the extreme 
high tide mark. 
 
Gentle (< 2%) 
Moderate (2 to 5%) 





























The Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Stakeholder Survey is intended for military 
and/or civilian MCM professionals.  The survey will be used to assess and categorize 
system performance attributes that a conceptual MCM system would need to exhibit.  
The survey will begin by requesting professional demographic information in order to 
attribute individual perceptions to stakeholder areas of interest. The primary 
questionnaire section will present a number of statements of comparison between two 
MCM system attributes, which will require a selected level of comparative criticality. 
This survey does not collect or use personally identifiable information and is not 
retrieved by personal identifier.  Therefore, the information collected is not subject to the 
Privacy Act of 1974.  
All survey questions are answerable by selecting the most appropriate statement 
of agreement with the posed query. 
Professional Demographic: 
The information provided below WILL NOT be used to identify you. It is used by 
the MCM development team to associate individual responses with identified stakeholder 
groups. 
1. My age is 
1 = 18 – 21 
2 = 22 – 30 
3 = 31 – 40 
4 = 41 – 50 




2. I was or currently am in the following position(s) [please select all that apply to 
you]: 
1 = Military Officer 
2 = Warrant Officer 
3 = Enlisted Member 
4 = Federal Civilian Employee 
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3. What is the best description of your MCM professional experience? (select all that 
apply to you) 
1 = Military User 
2 = Program Manager 
3 = System Developer 
4 = Intelligence Analyst 
5 = None 
Comment:
 ____________________________________________________________ 
For questions 4 through 12, refer to a theoretical system that will be used to protect 
Navy platforms from mine threats.  The theoretical system has the following ten 
critical system attributes:  
 
MC.1 Mission Planning: the ability to develop, maintain, execute, and 
coordinate anti-mine operation mission plans. 
MC.2 Environmental Characterization: the ability to identify mission critical 
environmental characteristics in support of anti-mine operations. 
MC.3 Underwater Object Detection: the ability to detect underwater objects 
within a specific minimum range required to conduct anti-mine operations. 
MC.4 Underwater Object Identification: the ability to characterize detected 
underwater objects within a specific minimum range required to conduct anti-
mine operations. 
MC.5 Command and Control: the ability to provide or leverage comprehensive 
capabilities necessary for command, control, communications, computers & 
information networking among MCM assets.  
MC.6 Underwater Threat Response: the ability to eliminate (or otherwise 
render safe) underwater objects determined to be a critical threat to the surface 
unit. 
MC.7 Survivability: the ability to operate in an operationally contested 
environment to include natural and man-made environmental conditions.  
MC.8 Availability: the probability that a system, when used under stated 
operational/support conditions, will operate satisfactorily when called upon.  
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MC.9 Interoperability: the ability to integrate current and future sensor systems 
through a common physical and data interfaces based on open system 
architectures. 
MC.10 Environmental Compatibility: the ability to operate in the maritime 
environment under varying conditions of temperature, pressure (depth from 
surface), salinity, sedimentation, and chemically degraded environments. 
 
In questions 4 through 12, you will be asked to compare nine of the above attributes to 
one common reference (i.e., Underwater Threat Response).  In each question, you will be 
asked to rate the impact of the reference relative to another attribute (e.g., Command and 
Control, Availability) using the scale below: 
 








Please PLACE AN “X” in the selected comparative level of criticality. 
(Note: The above options are arranged spatially on the following page such that placing an “X” closer to the more critical 
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Table 24.   Pair-wise Comparison for Stakeholder Survey 
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Table 25.   QFD 1 
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